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COUNTING ON THE ENVIRONMENT:
MEASURING AND MARKETING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN OREGON

New markets for the conservation of so-called ecosystem services, like the ability
of a wetland to mitigate floods, are emerging worldwide. According to environmental
economists, these markets require some metric - ecological or otherwise - that names the
relevant characteristics of the service to be traded as a commodity. But while this is often
assumed to be a simple task of science, I argue that the environmental regulators, ecoentrepreneurs, and conservationists who actually design and implement metrics are not so
easily brought into agreement. In “rolling-out” revamped metrics and protocols,
regulators and their conservationist allies in one market in Oregon haven’t established the
conditions for market success so much as they have constrained entrepreneurs. The
solutions to ecosystem destruction 20 years ago - privatization, commodification, and
commercialization - have become the obstacles which limit the market’s future viability.
The moments when capitalists find themselves saying “let’s sell nature to save it” - or
when states say it for them - can spell trouble for capitalists at the same time that they
seem like their escape hatch. Still, the short-term and long-term effects of market design
may differ; barriers to the market now may prove to be its success later.
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Chapter 1: Counting on the Environment
“We value what we price, but nature's services - providing clean air, fresh water, soil
fertility, flood prevention, drought control, climate stability, etc. - are, mostly, not traded
in any markets and not priced....We cannot manage what we do not measure and we are
not measuring either the value of nature's benefits or the costs of their loss.”
-Pavan Sukhdev, “Putting a value on nature could set scene for true green economy” in
The Guardian, 10 February 2010
1.1: Introduction
In this thesis, I argue that the markets in ecosystem services like salmon habitat,
wetland water storage and delay, and stream temperature that Sukhdev calls for may not
actually have the effect of commodifying and pricing the environment. I explain the
legal, scientific, and financial work environmental agency staff, non-profit
conservationists, and restoration entrepreneurs have invested into making one such
market in the US state of Oregon, showing when and why the task succeeds and fails, and
to what end. In these markets, state and federal regulatory agencies allow developers to
impact wetlands and streams if they compensate entrepreneurs, or “mitigation bankers,”
who speculatively restore ecosystems. Two of the most challenging issues market-makers
confront are how to measure the success of restoration work and deciding where in the
landscape restoration should be done. I share how they have dealt with these issues in a
project to introduce new metrics and protocols into the Oregon market, and at one
specific restoration site in particular, a testing ground called Half Mile Lane (HML; see
Appendix A for a reference of acronyms used here). I argue that the revamped
marketplace has failed to live up to its own goals because regulators’ and
conservationists’ new metrics and rules have not worked for the entrepreneurs doing
restoration on the ground (and sometimes not even for regulators and conservationists
themselves). Even in failing, however, this project of environmental governance
strengthens the hand of regulators and their conservationist allies, at least for the current
moment. The market right now has proven to be not so much a project of commodifying
and pricing ecosystem services, as one of state formation, legitimacy, and power.
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1.2: Half Mile Lane
On January 25, 2012, the non-profit conservation group Willamette Partnership
(WP) and the Oregon Department of State Lands (DSL), in conjunction with the US
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), authorized the trade of four salmon habitat credits
from HML to the Tualatin Hills Parks and Recreation Department (THPRD) (DSL
2012a). DSL did not sell the HML property where it had restored salmon habitat. Instead,
it dealt THPRD credits, or units of account representing the quality and quantity of
habitat created after DSL replaced a culvert and performed other stream and wetland
restoration work at HML. THPRD paid $1,114.32 for these credits so it could tell
environmental regulators like DSL that it had adequately compensated for a trail bridge it
is building that will degrade habitat elsewhere in the watershed (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).
The credit sale is banal yet remarkable. Suburban housing developers, state
Departments of Transportation, and others have traded wetland credits widely for over
twenty years. But beyond wetlands, the assessment and trade of other forms of
environmental degradation and restoration as credits, like salmon habitat, is only now
emerging. DSL’s sale establishes and governs nature not simply as a set of coordinates
delineating where a stream and salmon habitat exist but as a representation that signals to
state agencies that its buyer – the THPRD - has mitigated stream impacts one of its trail
extension projects will have caused elsewhere in the watershed in late 2012. In this
production of nature as credit, regulators, scientists, and entrepreneurial restorationists
are all actively involved in measuring and marketing streams and wetlands.
Bill Cronon (1992) reminds us that the making of nature as an abstract
representation (e.g. a credit or a futures contract) is not a new project. But the novelty of
the kind of scheme described above is twofold: 1) it is driven by state and federal
regulation; 2) the commodity traded is not a “good” so much as it is the “uplift,” or
improvement, in a “service” provided by a particular ecosystem. In drawing the
degradation and restoration of environments within financial circuits, markets in
ecosystem services have the potential to reshape how we imagine and relate to the
environment (e.g. Sullivan 2012). These new forms of governance, however, are far from
unified and well-articulated projects that are identical everywhere in mission and scope;
both economists and ecologists are divided in important ways on ecosystem services’
2

measurement and marketing (Dempsey and Robertson 2012). My aim is to watch how the
process of figuring out how to measure and market ecosystem services plays out at HML,
in Oregon, a state which is on the leading edge for ecosystem service policy and
programs.

Figure 1.2. Half Mile Lane. Source: Author.

1.3: Significance of HML
The accounting behind the HML-THPRD sale represents a significant departure
in the governance of water systems not only in Oregon, but the rest of the US as well.
While a grand total of only four salmon habitat credits were exchanged for not much
more than $1,000, it was one of the first sales from HML. HML, as a “bank” of credits, is
the pilot restoration site for WP’s innovative Counting on the Environment (COTE)
ecosystem service credit/debit accounting system and market protocol (WP 2009). The
WP actively promotes COTE nationally as a way to scale-up conservation, and the sale
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opens up an important window for watching how the crediting and debiting of nature
ascends - and hits sticking points - as a leading form of environmental governance.
The COTE metrics and protocol and their application at HML are remarkable for
three reasons. First, HML tests a new measure of restoration success that is explicitly
ecosystem services-based. WP had half of the wetland credits from the site calculated
with what is called a functional ecosystem assessment. The US state and federal
environmental agencies the WP works with are looking to move to measuring wetlands
and streams in a way that pulls out and emphasizes the specific functions that allow these
ecosystems to provide services to society. Functions are physical, biological, and
chemical processes, like the ability of a stream to transport sediment or of a floodplain
wetland to store surface water. The idea for many policy-makers and scientists is that
functional assessment can improve upon existing ecosystem assessments by clarifying
what exactly is lost at impact sites and gained, over time, with compensatory restoration.
In early January 2012, Oregon’s regional EPA office and WP circulated a request for a
consultant who could build on the functional wetland assessment to draft a stream
functional assessment for them. Though the assessment will go through a couple of years
of development and field testing, EPA and WP plan for it to be a model for other states in
the region.
Second, the HML-THPRD sale also exemplifies a move to market ecosystems as
composed of various functions. Perhaps the most novel import of the sale is that it
involved multiple kinds of ecosystem currencies – not only wetlands, but salmon habitat
and water quality as well. The credit buyer, THPRD, did in fact only purchase salmon
habitat credits. But in buying these, market administrators also removed an equivalent
amount of temperature and wetland credits from the ledger of available credits. The WP’s
market regulations allow buyers like THPRD to access a number of different types of
credits from a given “map unit” at a site. In purchasing credits of one type, however, the
amount of other credits, of different types, that are left to sell is proportionally reduced.
Because the ecological processes underlying the services at one site are to some extent
shared (e.g. groundwater recharge is a function vital to water temperature and wetland
habitat services), it would in theory be possible for a restoration entrepreneur to trade part
of a function twice or more. Despite the risk of selling more nature than a site actually
4

provides, for many regulators (e.g. Fox 2011) and marketers (e.g. White and Penelope
2013), the accounting maneuver of “stacking” multiple services can expand conservation
markets by compensating restorationists for each and every service they produce, not just
one stream or wetland.
Finally, the siting of HML represents a gesture by agencies toward watershed and
landscape-oriented governance. They are seeking to prevent developers from making
impacts to highly functioning sites, while ensuring that restoration for the market happens
in priority areas. These priority areas include sites that have the potential for restoration
of different kinds of ecosystems, sites within mapped “conservation opportunity areas”,
or especially well-functioning sites; HML is all of these. There is both a wetland and
stream on the site, the property lies within a priority area, and it was already somewhat
preserved and not very degraded. Regulators see in the COTE protocols a way to
encourage strategic site selection, in which restorationists seek out the best spots, as
opposed to opportunistic site selection, in which restoration gets done wherever there are
willing landowners. In sum, the HML-THPRD sale embodies three key moves for US
environmental governance by regulators, conservationists, and restoration entrepreneurs.
As signees to the final COTE document themselves noted, it was meant to:
“provide standard, functions-based credit calculation methodologies to measure
both impacts and benefits [functional accounting] in a way that provides new
incentives for restoring the breadth of ecosystem functions [stacking multiple
kinds of services] and moving impacts from the highest functioning sites
[watershed planning].” (WP 2009)
What HML potentially signifies as a new model for ecosystem governance,
however, only goes so far. The COTE process has not inspired entrepreneurial
restorationists to establish any other HML-style banks offering multiple credit types. The
new kind of functions-based wetland credit that agencies and conservationists are testing
at HML has not sold because they are more expensive. Though the salmon habitat credit
has sold several times now (the THPRD trade was the first time it did), there are still
lingering questions amongst regulators about whether it is something they want to
continue to deploy in the long-term. Finally, even for traditional wetlands-only
restoration projects, the state and conservationists have not inspired more strategic site
selection. HML may have been in a good position in the watershed, with opportunities for
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both wetland and stream restoration, but the idea has not yet caught on with
entrepreneurial bankers of ecosystem service credits.

Figure 1.3. Map of Washington County. Source: Author.

1.4: Research Question
When we hear someone like Pavan Sukhdev say that what needs to be done to
prevent environmental degradation is to “put a value on nature,” the challenge of resource
protection sounds so easy. But the task has not been so effortless in Oregon, as HML has
remained just a prototype for how regulators, conservationists, and entrepreneurs might
better valorize the environment. For some market actors - mainly regulators and nonprofit conservationists - this limitation has been unfortunate, while for those mitigation
bankers wanting to do restoration for the market as entrepreneurs, it has not been as much
of a problem. In order to explain what has gone right and wrong in Oregon, and to what
end, we need to understand the specific interests and hesitations of market actors.
6

The main question of this research is: what are different market actors’ and
institutions’ guiding rationales, or logics, in proposing and enacting the new kind of
market-oriented ecosystem service governance represented by COTE and HML?
At first glance, authors writing in what is an extensive scholarship on marketoriented environmental governance suggest that the logics driving those involved in
COTE and HML may revolve around the use of state power to provide “regulatory relief”
to developers and empower entrepreneurs to invest in restoration. In other words, the
logics of Oregon actors may be about neoliberalization - the privatization of
environmental degradation and restoration, the commercialization of ecosystem services
through their sale as credits, and the commodification of services as ecologists are
enrolled to measure them and restoration firms or, in the case of HML, DSL, assign them
a price (Bakker 2005; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Heynen et al. 2007). Scholars are
quick to note that these ways of thinking about and acting on the environment regularly
fail (Castree 2008). Successful or not, the literature also gives us reason to think these
logics are not going to look the same everywhere in the first place (McAfee and Shapiro
2010; Dempsey and Robertson 2012; Roth and Dressler 2012; Shapiro-Garza 2013; in
general, Gibson-Graham 2006). Both points warrant extending the research question to:
what are the different logics within regulatory, conservationist, and entrepreneurial sector
actors in Oregon? In what ways are logics disrupted or divergent to the extent that the
success of HML has been limited at best?
We could answer the question of why HML has not sold new kinds of credits or
motivated entrepreneurial restorationists to do similar kinds of banks in several different
ways. We could say that regulators and conservationists have been unable to maintain
trust, engagement, or vigor around the project of measuring and marketing ecosystem
services (e.g. O’Grady 2011). We might also answer that the problem is that market
actors did not get ecosystem services’ measure right. After all, as Sukhdev says, “we
cannot manage what we do not measure” and, for him, the right measure is a price that
comes out of the kind of fully-fledged market that has not happened in Oregon (Sukhdev
2010; cf. Sullivan 2012). Similarly, and finally, we could turn our gaze toward nature and
argue that market actors have encountered an “uncooperative,” complex biophysical
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environment in wetland and stream ecosystem services that proves to be something they
cannot account for (Bakker 2005; 2009).
The answer I provide in this thesis differs and is three-fold. I argue that the
rationales that come into conflict and cause market sticking points are regulatory ones often allied with conservationist logics - that are different from entrepreneurial
understandings of why there should be a market and how it should work. Regulators and
entrepreneurs spar over two issues, which constitute my first two answers, and which I
flesh out in chapters 3 and 4. The first problematic revolves around what kinds of
ecological assessments are deployed to define the credit commodities at the heart of the
market. I share regulators’ and bankers’ opinions on whether to allow the stacking of or
selling of multiple kinds of credits from one site, whether the salmon habitat credit is an
adequate credit, and the utility of functions-based accounting. I argue that their different
expectations about what ecosystem services and their metrics can do are what become
controversial in and limiting to the market. With functional assessment in particular,
regulators are hoping for a different set of results than entrepreneurs. They gain some
legitimacy in taking this position, however, because everyone agrees the old system is
untenable.
In assessing restoration success, market actors also consider the ecological
conditions and processes that occur across the landscape. This is the second market
problematic: where entrepreneurs should do mitigation banking? The developers of the
COTE protocol intended to drive restoration to the “right place” on the landscape and
limit impacts to those areas. As such, new assessments and market rules embody spatial
logics, but these are also diverse and contested. Adherents to a conservation logic of
ecosystem services see the value of restoring nature as fundamentally spatial - some
places are more worthwhile to restore than others. Entrepreneurs should be guided to do
restoration in these priority areas, they argue. But this conservation logic can come at the
expense of capital by forcing bankers into working off a smaller set of potential
restoration sites, and on sites that are more costly. Still, regulators are willing to say to
permittees, “don’t develop this place,” or to bankers, “do restoration here,” in a way that
has proved limiting to entrepreneurial restoration. This territorialization of nature reworks
and forms the state at a stronger position vis-à-vis capital, so that what appears to be a
8

revamping of the market to facilitate accumulation is at least now in fact a constraint to
marketization.
My final point in this thesis is that debates around what ecosystem assessments
are most appropriate and where entrepreneurs should do restoration for the market
illustrate deep contradictions in the commercializing and commodifying neoliberal logic
of ecosystem markets. While the state in Oregon wants entrepreneurs to restore
ecosystems and sell them as credit commodities, it also wants them to perform restoration
in locations that may not be the most advantageous to bankers - in “strategic” rather than
“opportunistic” places. Regulators are in a position where they oversee a market that is
based on the twin ideas of welcoming private investment in ecosystem services
restoration and permitting resource impacts, but yet they are uncomfortable with the idea
of letting bankers invest or developers impact wherever they please. Likewise, the state’s
move to roll-out new function-based measures of restoration success flounders on the fact
that entrepreneurs are tied to an older currency. Again, regulators have designed and
implemented a market that at its core was about facilitating private restoration of
ecosystem services, but at the same time they do not think that just any definition of the
credit commodity traded in the market will work. They would like to see a better credit,
but it is one that is, at least in the short-run, constraining entrepreneurial restoration.
The contradiction regulators confront illustrates that as the on-the-ground pilot for
a revamped market in ecosystem services HML is not necessarily neoliberal, contra what
many academic commentators might suggest (e.g. Büscher et al. 2012), though not all
(Mansfield 2004; Robertson 2007; McAfee and Shapiro 2010; Roth and Dressler 2012;
Shapiro-Garza 2013). Making a market in ecosystem services might seem like a clear-cut
case of a roll-out of rules and regulations favorable to a capitalist accumulation of new
kinds of resources. However, in Oregon, the state is at the same time constraining capital
vis-a-vis its position before the COTE protocol, at least in the short term. Whether
regulators will continue to hold their position, or whether entrepreneurs adjust to new
market conditions, is unclear at this point. Either way, right now, regulators’ and
conservationists’ pressing logic is what has made the market sticky so far.
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1.5: Literature Review
1.5a: Neoliberal natures and conservation
Many researchers characterize the commodification of nature as part and parcel of
a neoliberalization of government and economy (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Bakker
2005; Heynen et al. 2007; Castree 2008, 2011; Büscher et al. 2012). Neoliberalization is a
project of both “rolling back” state programs that impinge upon capitalist accumulation
and “rolling out” new rules, regulations, and protocols to foster markets (Peck and
Tickell 2002). Although these new programs and policies may still find their actual
foundations in government action, they at least have ideological grounds in their claim to
achieve social goals efficiently (Harvey 2005). For those interested in the relationship
between state, economy, and environment, neoliberalization entails policy-makers,
scientists, market actors, and others coalescing to de-regulate direct state management of
ecosystem use and impacts and to re-regulate ecosystem products and outcomes as
commodities (Robertson 2004). Some scholars distinguish between the neoliberalization
of natural resources and neoliberal conservation (Arsel and Büscher 2012; Büscher et al.
2012). This is the difference between how, say, water provisioning is privatized,
commercialized, and commodified (Bakker 2005, 2013) and how ecosystem protection or
restoration becomes the purview of private interest and gain at the expense of the state or
local communities (Büscher and Dressler 2012). In other words, “neoliberal conservation
shifts the focus from how nature is used in and through the expansion of capitalism, to
how nature is conserved in and through the expansion of capitalism” (Büscher et al. 2012,
4).
Research into nature commodified as a credit, however, is rather few and far
between. Where it does exist, there are two gaps I hope to fill: 1) scholars focus on
carbon offsets and other relatively settled metrics; 2) researchers work is largely confined
to the developing world. First, offset credits, to a large extent now constitute how
governments regulate and businesses account for carbon dioxide and indeed, most
research perspectives at least tangential to the crediting of nature focus on carbon (e.g.
Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Lansing 2011; Boyd et al. 2011). The measurement of
carbon is, however, a relatively agreed upon task – at least to the point of adequacy for a
global market and for various regional ones. Various protocols translate forest
10

restoration, gas destruction, and cover crop planting into a measure of the weight of
greenhouse-forcing gases kept out of the atmosphere or sequestered in the soil. What the
case of HML and the COTE process ask us to do instead is pay attention to how the
physical, chemical, and biological complexities of wetland and streams services are yet to
be boiled down into workable calculations that make a metric based on ecosystem
process rather than weight or volume. I watch, in action, the process of how regulators,
conservationists, and entrepreneurs come to agree on and put into practice these
protocols.
Secondly, because most carbon offset projects occur in developing countries,
most research is conducted there as well (cf. Robertson 2004; Hillman and Instone 2011).
Insights from those studies are certainly valuable, but I am concerned with the specific
dynamics that accompany crediting nature in an advanced capitalist country. McAfee and
Shapiro (2010) and Corbera and Brown (2008) show how ecosystem crediting programs
in Mexico are uniquely positioned in that country's specific political and economic
context. Corbera et al. (2006), for instance, show how the introduction of markets
reinforce existing power inequalities in a local community, while Shapiro-Garza (2013)
details how rural social movements are able to capture and hybridize a market-based
ecosystem services project. I am after that same sort of contextual analysis, but with an
eye toward Oregon. Oregon is different because land tenure arrangements, the
institutional coherence and position of the state, and the embeddedness of relations of
capitalist production and exchange differ from Mexico, or elsewhere (see McCarthy
2002; Robbins 2002 on how political ecology has translated to the first world). Neoliberal
governance is not identical in shape and form everywhere and is not a totalizing, selfactualizing discourse. The term “rolling” implies a sense of ease, consistency, and
closure, but in the literature, neoliberalization is acknowledged variously as a hybrid
(Larner 2003), variegated (Brenner et al. 2010), or overdetermined (Althusser 1980;
Gibson-Graham 2006) project. My research reinforces the point that neoliberalization as
a process is messy and plays out differently - sometimes successfully, sometimes
failingly, sometimes in hybrid fashion - in different places.
In the end, the thrust of the neoliberal natures research is that capitalists aim to
have the state to do its bidding, with negative results for the environment. As such, much
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has been said in the literature about whether and why neoliberalization fails (Castree
2008a,b). Less has been said about what happens as a consequence of neoliberalization
failing, but my research contributes here by drawing on three key points from the
literature on state theory. First, because the state is a social relation situated in particular
historical-geographical contexts, modern state regulation of capital involves civil societal
actors - including conservationist NGOs - just as much as it does bureaucrats (Jessop
2002). Secondly, states as coherent, forceful, and legitimate entities form in relation to not before - their projects of making sense of the environment (Mitchell 2006; Asher and
Ojeda 2009). Third, state projects that fail can still have the effect of extending new kinds
of social relations (Ferguson 2006). I show how attempts in Oregon to commodify
ecosystem services fail, but that this is not the end of the story. They instead have the
effect of forming state, civil society, and capital relations in favor of the state and allied
conservationists, at least for now, as part of a continuous regulation and re-regulation of
capitalist encounters with the environment.

1.5b: Political Ecology
I also draw on the work of political ecologists in order to understand how projects
of environmental governance like ecosystem services market-making in Oregon can fail
to come to fruition as planned and remake state, civil society, and capital
relations. Political ecologists’ thematic and topical interests are diverse and
interdisciplinary, ranging from takes on the way individuals and social movements
develop environmental identities to critiques of the use of habitat conservation as a means
of social control. They are, to the most common degree and highest abstraction,
concerned with showing how environmental phenomena that are regularly taken as
natural, or given, are contested and contingent. Political ecologists are primed to share
stories that demonstrate when and how environmental policy creates “winners and losers”
(Robbins 2011, 87), the different kinds of claims people make about nature, and how
resource access and use is politically and economically contextualized.
Political ecologists contextualize decisions about resource management within
“chains of explanation” that center on locally, regionally, and globally extensive political
and economic structural forces. They argue against the idea that the cause of
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environmental degradation is simply profit-maximizing rational actors. Instead, they
situate how people use land or develop knowledge about it within social norms
(Nightingale 2006), survival strategies (Stonich 1992), the introduction of capitalist social
relations, or devolution of state governance (Agrawal 2006).
Political ecologists contextualize environmental projects within these as they
change over time, and in engaging with the historical background to their cases, make
stronger, more convincing claims. Part of what makes Oregon’s market unique is a new
attempt by regulators and conservationists to measure the benefits of restoration and the
impacts of development differently than they have in the past and a historical lens is
necessary to understand why the state continues to press forward on this project to the
point of disrupting the entire market. For McAfee and Shapiro (2010), it proved
worthwhile to examine how a payments for ecosystem services program in Mexico
evolved over time. In each phase, the Mexican government altered how it paid peasants
for their restoration efforts and changes over the three phases reflected how over time
peasant social movements were able to embed their own collective interests within the
ostensibly neoliberal program. State regulators came to choose continuing the historical
role of the Mexican state in subsidizing rural communities against the wishes of World
Bank economists. For Bakker (2005), too, a historical lens was necessary in order to see
the "retrenchment" of water neoliberalization in Britain. Between the Thatcher era and
the late 1990s, regulating authorities and water agencies came to rethink the value of
commodifying water. Water itself was difficult to move between supplying and
demanding districts and use-based pricing was a burden on the poor. If Bakker had
stepped into her research only at one particular time, she would have found it self-evident
that municipal water systems in Britain had either been successfully neoliberalized, or at
another time, never really neoliberal. The basis for her central thesis that neoliberal water
governance is fractious and shaped by fluvial physics would have been nulled. By
thinking historically, I attempt to make sure that by stepping into the Oregon scene in the
midst of regulators’ and conservationists’ attempted roll-out of new functional ecosystem
assessments, I do not write their market-making off as evidently neoliberal or not.
In their founding statement on political ecology, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987,
17) wrote not just about “chains of explanation,” but of deploying these alongside the
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“concerns of ecology.” Political ecologists are critical of how scientists, bureaucrats, and
land users produce knowledge about the environment, and in their critique they make two
kinds of claims (Robbins 2011). First, they make claims about how nature works, in order
to debunk “apolitical” rehearsals of, for instance, Malthusian explanations of land
degradation and deforestation in West Africa (e.g. Bassett and Koli Bi 2000). This allows
them to demonstrate what work environmental policy performs if it does not actually
address the root of the issue policy-makers intend it to. Political ecologists also make
claims about how policy-makers, businesses, scientists, and conservationists themselves
narrate how environmental processes work (e.g. Peet and Watts 1996; Turner 1999). In
my research, contextualizing the production, circulation, and application of knowledge
(Goldman et al. 2011) about something like salmon habitat makes for more convincing
arguments about how neoliberalizations triumph, hybridize, or falter because of what
Ward (2013, 3) calls “sui generis socio-natural attributes.”
In particular, the “social nature” concept shows us when and how ecology is and
is not useful in explaining market outcomes (Castree and Braun 2001). For students of
“social natures,” the metaphors scientists and economists employ in describing something
called “salmon habitat” are more accessible, meaningful, and powerful than the “truth” of
nature itself. Nature either does not exist independently of social articulations of it
(Harvey 1996; Latour 1999) or at the very least asking after the truth of nature is a
tedious and irrelevant question (Demeritt 1998). Latour (1999) develops a brilliant image
of what social nature looks like on the ground. Latour’s lab is in the Amazon, where he
examines the botanical and pedological practice of describing transitions between forest
and savanna ecosystems. His point is that the field study’s work describing those
transitions - proved in journal articles and lab notebooks - always refer back to other
pieces of paper where data was organized or to other plants or other concepts endlessly.
He largely paves the way for a social natures approach to neoliberal natures in his
elaboration of these “circulating references.” For him, there is no hope of ever grounding
a final truth about this particular case of forest-savanna transition.
Latour’s claim that representations of ecological processes endlessly reference
each other does not mean that nature is irrelevant to the privatization, commercialization,
or commodification of the environment. It does suggest rethinking how and why nature
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matters. Ecological assessment, functions-based or otherwise, for wetland and stream
markets is one project of circulating references. Like Latour’s colleagues in the Amazon,
assessors go out to sites and generate ecological data from restoration sites that always
refers back to some previous measure, claim, place, or idea. But because assessment is
reference or representation, rather than “materiality,” it does not mean that the circulation
of knowledge cannot be stopped or disrupted, “intransigent” (Braun 2006) or
“uncooperative” (Bakker 2005). Indeed, my goal is to see when the circulation of
ecological references flounders. This is part of my larger project of paying attention to
the precarity of the logics of assessment, in order to explain why HML and COTE have
not moved much beyond the prototype stage.

1.5c: Science and Technology Studies (STS)
“We don’t want scientists saying what the risk of a lawsuit is, and we don’t want lawyers
saying what the value of a wetland credit is.”
-Doug MacNair, Cardno ENTRIX, “What’s the Value of Valuation?” session at the
Ecosystem Services Markets: Making Them Work conference, Madison, WI, June 2011.
Where Latour leads us with his discussion of circulating references is into a
literature on the social construction of science. He gives us good reason to follow experts
like pedologists and botanists “in action” - or in the Oregon case, the conservationists
authoring, consultants performing, and regulators judging the market’s ecological
assessments. I see his approach as yet another way political ecologists can contextualize
their explanations of successful and failed environmental management. My research
contributes to the project of bridging PE and STS (Forsyth 2003; Lave 2012, 2013) by
way of analyzing the expert production, circulation, and application of ecological
knowledge.
When Ward (2013, 2) claims that “specific sociopolitical actors produce, modify,
and cope with the terms of market-oriented rule-making regimes” he is talking about the
subjectivity of scientific, entrepreneurial, and regulatory experts. He refers to the way that
they are subject to social roles and how they see that subjection. In different ways,
political ecologists are starting to pay attention to how individuals - in roles as regulators,
activists, conservationists, or entrepreneurs - think about, identify with, and enact
environmental policy (Robbins and Krueger 2000; Robertson 2010; Brannstrom 2011;
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Lave 2012; Doyle et al. 2013; Ward 2013). They do so to demonstrate how
environmental knowledges, opinions, and performances associated with particular roles
(e.g. conservationists know larger restoration areas provide better long-term ecosystem
protection and so they work through government to advocate for more of these kinds of
areas) are often shared by individuals across often conflicting roles (e.g. conservationists
and entrepreneurs) and how this can make governance sometimes more complicated,
sometimes more divisive, or sometimes more consensual. In the case of Oregon’s
ecosystem services markets, individual regulators, conservationists, and entrepreneurs
comprise the market governance process, but these individuals are not just legal scholars,
nature-lovers, and profit-seekers. As Doug MacNair would have it, the valuation of
wetlands and streams demands scientists and lawyers perform their proper expertises, but
to what extent - and when - do scientists and lawyers actually act just as knowledgeproviders and legal counsels in those roles?
For example, it has been easy for some market-makers in Oregon to forget that
HML serves as a bank of credits. In early August of 2012, I met one of DSL’s mitigation
program coordinators at HML. We ran through an assessment questionnaire in order to
evaluate the site’s ecological performance. The calculator does not require extensive
ecological training from its user, but she was formally trained in ecology. Eventually, she
got to talking about what a private sector banker of credits would have to do at HML to
earn credits. She explained how she and her regulator colleagues at EPA and Corps - as
members of an Interagency Review Team - would judge the banker’s work. DSL,
however, is the entrepreneur at HML: “well, I guess I’m the banker here,” she corrected
herself after having realized her slip. In that moment, she had to choose to be the banker
instead of the regulator. Permitting and reviewing the site may have been a more
accustomed task for her, but selling credits did not necessarily come so easily. After all,
as another regulator told me, one of the drivers of the COTE process was to get agency
staff to learn to “think like economists,” as the move to credit stacking and functionsbased accounting made market implementation more complex.
Focusing on the moments when the state, as comprised of individuals performing
ordinary tasks of ecological assessment (Mitchell 2006), cannot fully grasp and enact its
purported role as tester and guarantor of new market-based initiatives may do a lot to
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explain why HML has not been immediately successful as a site for neoliberalizing
nature. Throughout the thesis, I show that the experts at the heart of making the Oregon
market do not fall neatly into one category or the other. As one person put it to me, he is a
“hybrid” - wildlife ecologist and designer of software for the market, all in one. In short,
it may not be appropriate to say that regulators are out to satisfy the letter of the law and
nothing else, since this ignores the fact that many may have ecological motivations as
well. Nevertheless, as the regulator at HML played the part of the assessor rather than the
banker, people choose to perform one logic or another at certain times. As such there may
be certain logics or positions that do come to ground and matter more than others, and I
demonstrate how and why they do.

1.6: Methods
The methods I employed in this research square with and put flesh to the
theoretical approach I outlined above. I conducted interviews with market actors,
reviewed key documents, and participated in the site visits and office work that comprise
the ecosystem assessments of restoration success. Interviews helped me develop an
understanding of regulators’, conservationists’, and entrepreneurs’ subjectivities and
these conversations also told me a bit about the history of assessment development.
Reviewing legal statutes, market protocols, and COTE workshop notes told me even
more about the history of the market. Finally, participating in visits to restoration sites
and performing the office work of assessment helped me to understand both regulators’
sense of how they see themselves regulating the market, as well as the ways ecological
representations matter to the market.
1.6a: Interviews
The goal of having conversations with policy, science, and market actors involved
with HML is, in the broadest sense, to get people to work through and shed significance
on a context to which I only have static, textual access (Kvale 1996; Valentine 1997).
This involves asking people (often those who wrote or financed a particular document)
about how something happened, or how something described in a document works.
Interviews are important tools for picking apart representations of actors and ideas that
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are either too glossy or wholly invalid (Schoenberger 1991). Interviews, as semistructured conversations, foster an atmosphere that allows for informants to work through
problems and for researchers to grasp how informants narrate those problems.
I asked people to tell me about their opinions on and knowledge of how HML was
developed and is currently managed as a model mitigation bank. I conducted interviews
during a visit to Oregon in the summer of 2012 with over 20 regulators, conservationists,
and entrepreneurial actors. I talked with regulators from both state and federal agencies,
conservationists from several different influential non-profits, and consultants who both
advise bankers and run their own restoration banks, but are formally trained in fields
ranging from soil science to botany to wildlife ecology. I chose who to interview, and
what questions to ask them, based on a preliminary reading of notes from the COTE
workshop (WP 2009). I tried to speak with as many participants from the workshop
process as I could. In general, I evaluated my sampling plan on its appropriateness and
adequacy (Kuzel 1999). It would be inappropriate to choose informants based on a
random sample, in part because the number of people involved in making Oregon’s
ecosystem services markets is rather small. After talking to COTE participants, I
“snowballed” several new contacts by asking informants who else it would make most
sense to talk to (Valentine 1997). The goal was to interview enough people to reach some
sort of information “saturation” point at which no new knowledge is gained from
additional interviews (Kvale 1996). I transcribed interviews in Kentucky using a
modified form of the guide Poland (1995) outlines. I followed Cope’s (2003) suggestion
for coding interviews – a two-step process of first making broad descriptive codes and
then analytical ones. In general, I recursively drew out key themes and paying attention to
the emic categories informants themselves use while I derive useful etic, or analytical,
categories (Crang 1997).

1.6b: Documents
The various methods I utilized facilitated one another, but there were multiple
specific goals in my document analysis. The first was to understand how people code and
present complex issues – for instance, how they understand functional ecosystem
assessment and its utility (or not) at HML. Related, the second was to read documents for
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embodying compromises between different market logics (regulatory, conservationist,
entrepreneurial). The third reason was perhaps more mundane – documents are where a
lot of the action is – for example: letters between regulators and market administrators
and printed spreadsheets which list the credits available from HML.
I began the research by reading: notes from the workshop to set up the rules of the
market; training manuals for the credit calculators; permits issued to projects buying
credits from HML; the HML “instrument” which lays out the plan for restoration at the
site. I also produced some summary statistics on credit “banks” in Oregon, to get a sense
of how HML was different from other sites in the state. I examined what I consider to be
two different sets of documents, but which do overlap greatly: regulatory and technical.
Regulatory documents include both documents such as Exhibit D from the EPA/WP’s
Request for Proposals to develop a stream assessment framework as well as files
documenting, approving, and managing specific mitigation projects (WP 2012).
Technical documents are both market and science-oriented. An example of a market
technical document is the Crediting Protocol (2009), which spells out how trades from
HML and other WP restoration sites can happen. An example of a science-sector
technical document is a brochure from the firm Parametrix (2010) which details how its
Ecometrix assessment tool can be used by field technicians to measure indicators that
then wrap up into scores for various ecosystem functions. Parametrix took a chunk of this
tool to make the calculator for salmon credits used at HML. In the main, document
analysis was conducted during the summer before the site visit as a way of developing
background in the issue.

1.6c: Assessment work
Reading the technical documentation for assessments help me understand how
assessments work on the ground when I had the chance to visit restoration sites. Hearing
what people have to say in interviews and what they write in documents are two moments
that get at my research question. Yet another element is what people do - how they take
those documents and put them into practice. This third method involved two moments: 1)
participating in assessments in action at HML; 2) tagging along with regulators and
entrepreneurs to visit other restoration sites. The idea with 1) was to gain a basic
19

understanding of what functional measurement methodologies mean in use on the ground
(which also means in the office). The regulatory and market logic behind new stream and
wetland assessments is that they should be relatively rapid and simple to perform: done
by two people, with two days of training, in two days. My goal was to capture their
explanation of what the HML site means for them – what a site restored with a "splice
and dice" functional framework looks like and what parts of the assessment are
straightforward and which potentially constitute problems for regulators and
entrepreneurs. In sum, I had the opportunity to do four site visits, each of which gave me
a sense for: 1) what regulators expect from restoration sites; 2) how consultants think
about which sites are good and how to assess them; 3) how bankers think about site
selection and investment; 4) how site assessment with the credit calculators works.
I draw the interview, document, and site-based research together within a case
study frame. Looking at one particular market-making endeavor, rather than all efforts
everywhere to commodify ecosystem services (e.g. Mariola 2012a; Sullivan 2013),
allows me to trace out the causes and implications of failures, success, and hybridity. If I
were to set out to understand how the legal, scientific, financial, and conservationist
project to make the world “an immense collection of ecosystem services” (Robertson
2012b) operated writ large, I would be less likely see the subjectivities, changes over
time, and production of ecological knowledge that I have suggested contribute to these
outcomes. What Blaikie (1985), in his formulation of political ecology, long-ago called
“the view of bureaucrat in the airplane,” obscures too much. My narrative instead seeks
to extend from the bottom-up in order to rethink what we know about the project of
market-oriented environmental governance (Burawoy 1991). To that end, I now turn to
background Oregon’s ecosystem service markets, HML, and COTE. In the next chapter, I
explain how in the HML and COTE projects regulators and conservationists have
engaged in national and international conversations about ecosystem services, while
remaining very much grounded in the Oregon context.
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Chapter 2: Ecosystem Services - a Conversation on Conservation
Driving down Half Mile Lane in the middle of the Oregon dry season, one of the
first sights that stands out is a large pool of water near where the road crosses Roderick
Creek (see figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 and 2.2 below). It’s there this time of year because a
beaver has built a dam just downstream of the site that is backing up water. At the dam,
the landowner has jokingly put a “Home for Sale” sign pointing towards the beaver’s
habitat (see figure 2.1 below). The dam does provide an ecosystem service to
downstream communities by forcing nutrients and sediments to settle out, but it also
limits other services, like fish habitat. The landowner would rather get rid of the beaver
because it is preventing him as the consulting restorationist on the project from finishing
up some of the planting work. Staff from DSL realize his concern, but are not planning to
do anything about it. After all, some estimates put pre-settlement North American beaver
populations at 400 million and conservationists have gone to considerable lengths - such
as paradropping beavers into underpopulated areas (Ferry 2012) - to bring them back.
In this chapter, I explain how the Oregon ecosystem service market works. There
are certainly plenty of interesting market trivia, like whether and how to manage beavers,
but I start getting at the market’s more systemic sticking points. In the first section, I
introduce the entrepreneurial actors of the market. I also discuss the market’s state and
federal legal foundations and the regulators who write and implement its rules. In the
second section, I narrate a history of environmental politics in Oregon that informs how
regulators have designed the market with the help of non-profit conservationists.
Stepping back, I point to the ways environmental economists and others outside of formal
policy arenas have since the mid-1990s started talking about nature as a set of ecosystem
services. Environmental economists and their allies’ conversation on conservation sets
another stage for ecosystem services market-making in Oregon. In the last section, I
describe in detail how an entrepreneurial banking would go about site selection,
ecological assessment, and marketing credits. My goal here is to walk through the
Oregon market as a way of introducing those sticking points in Oregon’s market that I
showcase in the following two chapters. As such, throughout the chapter I highlight the
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important parts played by functions-based ecological assessment and restoration site
selection.

Figure 2a. “Home For Sale.” A beaver dam is backing up water onto the HML site.
Source: Author.
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Figure 2b. The HML restoration site as seen from above. In the middle of the photo is the
pool that was created after a beaver built a dam downstream. Source: Author; Google
Maps.
2.1: Market Frameworks
2.1a: Permittees, landowners, entrepreneurs and consultants
In markets for wetlands and streams, environmental regulatory agencies allow
public and private entities to compensate restorationists as a way of mitigating resource
impacts that the agencies would otherwise prohibit or ignore. In Oregon’s market, these
permittees range from private housing developers to public parks and recreation
departments like THPRD to the Oregon Department of Transportation. THPRD, as we
saw in the last chapter, needed a permit for the impact it was going to create as it
extended a recreation trail across a stream. It compensated for that impact by purchasing
an amount of credits from HML equivalent to the scope of the impact. New construction
of housing subdivisions comprises a sizable portion of the number of impacts to which
HML in particular is supplying credits. The other large portion of impacts is for road
extension projects that run into wetlands or streams.
Land managers establish “mitigation banks” in order to sell credits to permittees.
Banks are both plans and places; they are financial and legal instruments land managers
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draft and follow as they sell credits from a particular place or property where they have
undertaken ecological restoration. The practice of banking credits in Oregon is mostly
limited to mom and pop ryegrass seed farmers in the Willamette Valley looking for extra
income on a piece of land. Sometimes farmers will take a project they want help
financing and developing to an entrepreneur willing to invest in restoration, and
sometimes an entrepreneur will come to them with something in mind. In either case, the
land remains the landowner’s, but it is typically under a long-term protection agreement
or conservation easement. Banks must also be approved by the regulatory agencies,
which in Oregon have signed off on around 30 since the practice started there in the late
1980s. There are a couple of exceptions to this general model of mitigation banking. At
HML, the banker is not the site’s landowner, nor a private entrepreneur contracting with
the landowner, but DSL, a public agency. Also, a new, more speculative type of banking
firm is entering the Oregon market. Unlike a farm, consultant, or government
bureaucracy, these companies’ sole purpose is in banking as a business venture. They
often outright purchase the land they need to do restoration projects. Already, the
California-based restoration firm Wildlands has purchased land and started an
endangered species and wetland bank in southern Oregon.
Bankers - landowners, public agencies, or otherwise - hire private consultants
with scientific training to run ecological assessment questionnaires on restoration sites.
The purpose of assessment is to “measure and predict outcomes” of restoration, or
degradation, in order to know the kind and degree of improvement and impairment (WP
2012, 1). A salmon habitat assessment, or calculator, for instance, requires the user to
quantify the amount and size of downed trees or, “large woody debris,” present and
expected on the site. Consultants can then calculate the number of salable credits as the
difference between site conditions pre- and post-restoration. In the same way, developers
calculate debits as the difference in habitat pre- and post-road construction, trail
extension, or other kind of impact.
A cottage industry of consultants has grown in Oregon in response to bankers’
and developers’ need to have trained individuals judge sites for crediting and debiting
purposes. Consultants not only perform ecological assessments on sites, but also help
their clients through the process of validating and registering credits as well as
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monitoring site progress toward restoration goals. Their educational backgrounds are
rather diverse, ranging from soil science to ecology and geology. Each academic
background tends to produce a distinct view on the goals of mitigation, although they
downplay the effect that has on restoration practice. Many consultants in Oregon are
“single shingle” operations, meaning they function independently and not as part of a
larger environmental consulting or engineering/design firm. They assist restoration
projects done for non-regulatory reasons and they assess compensatory mitigation
projects that are implemented by developers like THPRD themselves and not bankers.
This form of compensatory mitigation is also known as permittee responsible mitigation
(PRM). The majority of consultants I talked with do advise bankers, however, and there
are even some consultants who operate their own mitigation banks. Consultants see
themselves as providing independent ecological advice to bankers and permittees, but
they are still more market players than anything else. They are responsive to market
conditions in many ways. The 2007-2010 recession, for instance, wiped out many
consulting operations as the demand for housing development projects imploded.

2.1b: Regulations and regulators
The housing market may be driven more by global credit flows than by
regulations, but markets for aquatic ecosystem services would not exist without them.
The legal basis for these markets is in the Clean Water Act (CWA) section 404 system of
permits for impacts to waters of the United States. 1 This program of land use permitting
is run on a day-to-day basis the US Army Corps of Engineers with oversight from the US
EPA. An impact, as defined in section 404, is an addition to or removal of material from
a wetland or stream, as when THPRD adds concrete pylons to a stream to build its trail
extension.
Nowhere in the CWA does Congress actually mandate that the agencies must
oversee markets in impact offsets. Instead, the regulatory framework for the market has
grown over time as agencies have developed guidelines - sometimes as no more than
what amounts to internal staff memos - for asking permittees to compensate for their
aquatic resource impacts. As regulatory practice, compensation emerged in the late 70s
1

33 U.S.C. § 1344; CWA § 404
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and early 80s as EPA staff setting the criteria by which the Corps judged permits realized
that the Corps was likely to rubber stamp most of them. EPA felt the need to revamp how
they conditioned permits, in order to stem wetland loss and the agencies ultimately
agreed to design a sequential approach to permitting developers. To get a permit,
developers must first avoid and minimize resource impacts, and only then are they
required to compensate or trade for any remaining impacts. 2 (Hough and Robertson 2009;
Gardner 2011). Corps and EPA lead this permitting process, which involves public
comments and comments from related agencies. The final determination about whether to
allow a project to proceed and on what terms rests with Corps and EPA.
Even with a sequential approach to permitting, the agencies found that they were
not necessarily meeting the goals of the CWA to ensure the integrity of aquatic resources.
Wetland loss continued at astounding rates. Towards the end of the 80s, Vice President
George H.W. Bush, as presidential candidate, championed a policy calling for no net loss
of wetlands. The idea was to direct Corps and EPA to emphasize the compensation part
of the mitigation sequence as a way of ensuring that wetlands paved over would be
replaced. The directive, put in motion by Bush months after he came into office, set the
stage for the contemporary focus on market and entrepreneurial mitigation banking
(Robertson 2000).
In Oregon, DSL has run a similar resource protection program under state law
alongside the evolution of the federal program. Oregon has what is known as a
Removal/Fill (R/F) law on the record which, squeaking in in 1971 before the 1972 Clean
Water Act, establishes a permit review program for developers adding or removing
material from wetlands and waters of the state. 3 Moreover, at around the same time that
the federal agencies were beginning to think about no net loss and asking permittees to
compensate for impacts, Oregon lawmakers established in 1989 a compensatory
mitigation component to permit review and approval. DSL gets to sit at the table
alongside Corps to review permits and works with Corps and EPA to set the criteria by
which they judge permits and bank proposals.

2

And allowed to compensate for their impact. Developers cannot just propose buying their way
out of permit conditions
3
Oregon Revised Statutes § 196.600
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There are two emerging exceptions to the fact that most of Oregon’s ecosystem
service market activity is centered on CWA section 404 and Oregon’s R/F law. Both are
still conceptually very similar to section 404 and the R/F law. First, under another part of
the CWA, section 402, EPA runs another permit program for pollutants that are added by
pipe to aquatic resources, like when a power plant discharges hot or toxic wastewater into
a river. EPA has the authority to impose a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) of a
pollutant in a given watershed, which is basically a cap on pollution kind of like the no
net loss directive for wetlands and streams. Polluters falling under a TMDL can reduce
pollution and trade any reduction below their individual target, as a credit, to other
polluters needing to meet the cap (see Mariola 2012a). There are also new markets in
endangered species. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is implemented by the US Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS) for land plants and animals and by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) for
marine species. They ask private developers as well as other government agencies to
avoid “jeopardizing” the survival of threatened and endangered species. Typically, this
has meant preventing development projects from going forward, or at least compelling
developers to modify them so as to avoid “harming” species (Proctor and Pincetl 1999;
Feldman and Jonas 2000). However, USFWS and NMFS have relatively recently started
to authorize species banking in some parts of the country and for some species. The idea
is much like wetland and stream banking: developers impacting species purchase credits
from a conservation bank in order to offset their effect.
Staff-level interpretations of ESA, CWA sections 402 and 404, and Oregon’s R/F
law and juridical rulings have been pivtoal to making the market what it is today. This is
especially true for CWA markets (Hough and Robertson 2009; Gardner 2011), which
exist nationally but operate differently in different regions (Womble and Doyle 2012;
Doyle et al. 2013). The decisions about what makes for avoidance, minimization, and
adequate compensation are not necessarily Washington, D.C. decisions; the federal
agencies have regional and district offices around the country and in Portland, Oregon
specifically, with staff handling individual cases. Often times there are few, if any staff
exclusively designated to overseeing mitigation at an office like this. For instance, it took
several years after establishing the program in 1989 for the Oregon legislature to finally
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fund a full-time mitigation specialist at DSL. Limited staff resources can make for
disjointed and irregular policy-making, but so too can having to work in conjunction with
staff from sister agencies like USFWS, to approve ecological assessments, permits and
trades, develop criteria and standards, and monitor banking sites. In the case of DSL, staff
also manage the sale of credits from the agency’s own bank sites, like HML. Moreover,
these regulators on the frontlines of ecosystem service markets are not often graduates of
public policy or political science programs. Instead, they are typically trained at the
master’s level in some kind of ecological science such as fisheries biology or as civil
engineers. The ecological/ engineering split typically describes the difference in staff
background and approaches between the Corps and the environmental agencies. A variety
of different actors make up the regulatory end of the market. Put another way, regulators
are not just bureaucrats, they are ecologists and sometimes bankers too, as in the case of
DSL staff who oversee the HML bank.

2.1c: The 2008 Mitigation Rule
It was not until a rule put out by the Corps and EPA in 2008 that the agencies first
comprehensively addressed compensatory mitigation in administrative rule. 4 In the 2004
National Defense Authorization Act, the US Congress asked the Corps and EPA to
formalize the way they went about authorizing mitigation, and in particular, to advance
the use of banking for offsetting wetland and stream impacts. The rule’s authors set the
stage for an economically and ecologically revamped market in four ways.
As Congress had asked, regulators first prioritized mitigation banking of credits
over developers undertaking their own restoration. Their goal was to ensure better
ecological outcomes from compensatory mitigation. Corps and EPA were responding to a
report from the National Research Council in 2001 which had proved scathing to the
approach known as permittee-responsible mitigation (PRM) (NRC 2001). In PRM,
permittees undertake the task of restoring degraded wetlands as a way of offsetting their
impacts. Building off of similar reports on mitigation from around the country, including
Oregon (Schaich and Franklin 1995), the NRC found that many PRM projects failed
4

33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332 (2008); 40 C.F.R. § 230 (2008); Administrative rules have the weight of
statutory laws like the Clean Water Act. On the difference between guidance and rules see:
Salzman and Thompson 2003; Gardner 2011
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because they were surrounded by negative land uses, constructed only after having been
permitted, and faced little regulatory oversight. In the 2008 rule, regulators argued that
one site with a bank of sellable credits established speculatively in advance of
development impacts in the watershed would be easier for them to oversee and to compel
long-term management actions from than many individual permittee-responsible sites.
Banking may or may not be more ecologically successful than other forms of
compensatory mitigation. The NRC report highlighted the need to improve restoration
siting in order to achieve restoration success, a task which regulators took up in the rule
as a second priority. A mitigation bank that an entrepreneur places in the middle of a
housing development is likely to be subject to ecological stress, but a bank that a banker
puts in next to an already-conserved area might be especially valuable. Taking up the
report’s findings, many public commentators argue that entrepreneurs have to work in the
right spot in the landscape for banks to be worthwhile. This is reflected in the 2008 rule,
in which regulators called for a watershed approach to bank site selection. Agency staff
are supposed to ask bankers to justify their proposal to make a bank in part by explaining
how the site meets watershed-wide habitat, hydrological, or other ecological priorities.
Bankers are supposed to point to some comprehensive watershed plan, but what counts as
a watershed plan is left to each agency district to decide. Whether each plan will mean
siting should be done to maximize positive ecological effects is not clear.
Third, the rule called for better assessment and crediting of compensation. Until
this point, the way that bankers across the country have earned credits for their
restoration work has been based on proxies like acres of wetland restored. Spatial extent
alone makes for a lousy predictor of the viability and importance of a restored ecosystem,
but it is a metric by which agencies can track their progress toward the “no net loss” of
wetland acreage. In the 2008 rule, federal staff called on district staff to develop better
standards that look to either the ecological functions of a site like floodplain surface
water storage or to the condition of habitats and ecological communities. Regulators and
conservationists believe that functional assessments provide a better measure of a
restoration site’s ecological processes.
Finally, to the chagrin of many public commentators, the rule also explicitly calls
for establishing criteria and creating assessments for stream mitigation. Before the rule,
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the program emphasized wetland - in fact, the EPA office overseeing it was called the
Wetlands Division. Standards for how agency staff should assess impacts to streams and
proposals to compensate for these impacts were largely lacking (Lave et al. 2008).
Commentators worried that the inclusion of streams in the rule would only further
streams’ degradation, and that stream restoration was too complex and scientifically
uncertain to make up for losses. Regulators responded by pointing out that stream
impacts and compensation were already allowed, but that streams were regularly
compensated “out of kind.” That is, because of a lack of acceptable metrics, one kind of
stream might be restored with a different kind (e.g. an intermittent stream for a perennial
one). Regulators argued that better assessments and standards would allow them to
require compensation of streams for streams, “in-kind.”
The 2008 rule on mitigation was a milestone in the evolution of metrics and
guidelines for how to trade wetlands and streams. In this section, I introduced the two
main sets of characters at play in these markets in the US: entrepreneurial and regulatory
actors. There are developers who, in building housing subdivisions, become permittees,
bankers who perform ecological restoration in order to earn mitigation credits that they
can sell to permittees, and regulators who craft and implement the rules for it all. These
regulators and entrepreneurs are the main players nationally, but state by state, district by
district, more actors and institutional environments take the stage.

2.2 Counting on the Environment
2.2a: Enlibra
In Oregon, regulators have allied with conservationists to implement the
directives of the 2008 rule, and have done so in conversation with existing state
initiatives, mandates, and institutional settings. Their work has required bringing different
actors with sometimes different mandates and agendas to the table. In August 2008, a
series of five workshops called Counting on the Environment (COTE) were hosted by the
non-profit conservation group, the Willamette Partnership (WP). As a result of these
workshops, a variety of regulatory agencies and conservationists agreed to test a new
market protocol, also called COTE, in a joint public-private endeavor. In the protocol,
COTE participants launched new functions-based methodologies for measuring wetland
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and stream restoration efforts which emphasized watershed planning. HML was the onthe-ground pilot project that emerged from the conversations at COTE.
The story of how the COTE workshops came to be in many ways revolves around
current Oregon governor John Kitzhaber. In multiple terms spanning more than a decade,
Kitzhaber is a recurring character in conservation in the state. In the early to mid-1990s,
state regulators and public officials were confronting the prospect of new endangered and
threatened species listings. The northern spotted owl undoubtedly drew the most attention
(Prudham 2004; W. Robbins 2004; Proctor and Pincetl 1999), but salmon were also on
the feds’ docket. State leaders realized that in order to revive declining salmon
populations, there was a need for voluntary - as opposed to government mandated or
regulation-driven - habitat restoration. In 1997, under the leadership of Kitzhaber, they
produced what was known as the “Oregon Plan,” a major component of which was the
creation of dozens of watershed councils throughout the state. These councils are statesupported non-profit entities that engage in stream, wetland, and fish habitat restoration
throughout the state. The Plan directed state staff to provide councils with technical and
organizational capacity, but that goal proved untenable over the next couple of years as
staff became overextended. In 1999, Oregonians then passed a state ballot measure to
dedicate lottery revenue to a new government entity that would oversee restoration
efforts. Since the late 90s, the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board (OWEB) has
directed over several hundred million dollars to watershed councils to conduct nearly
5500 miles of stream restoration alone (OWEB 2011).
OWEB and the Oregon Plan represent a set of principles of governance dubbed
“Enlibra” that Kitzhaber has advocated for throughout the West since 1998 (Leavitt
Center n.d.). The big idea behind Enlibra is to increase collaboration between the
communities losing jobs from declining logging or other resource extraction operations
and the government agencies that are increasingly more interested in achieving ecological
goals. As federal agencies listed the spotted owl, a loose coalition of residents, thinktanks, and industry throughout the West had begun to protest what they saw as excessive
constraints on rural livelihoods from federal land use policies. Seeing themselves as
proper stewards, Wise Use movement participants wanted greater access to log, hunt on,
and graze federally-owned lands (McCarthy 2002). Kitzhaber’s Enlibra principles of: 1)
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decentralized public-private partnerships; 2) science-informed, but values-based policy;
3) performance and outcomes-oriented funding - all in the name of sustaining rural
livelihoods - were aimed at legitimizing state environmental management in the face of
Wise Use activists’ property access claims. But the Enlibra principles had a more general
thrust as well. As I show below, they also structured the approach of the COTE
workshops.
Citizen concerns over rights to use land - federal or private - have played
prominent parts in wetland and stream mitigation markets (Gardner 2011). They have
been a major reason why Oregon environmental agencies have moved to ecosystem
functions-based accounting. A key property rights court case and related piece of
legislation tell the story of what compelled DSL to actually meet its functions mandate. 5
In a series of court battles that he has waged for nearly 30 years now, Mel Stewart, has
sued the City of Corvallis and DSL to prevent them from regulating a two acre piece of
property he owns (Figure 2.3). His argument is that even though it looks and feels like a
wetland site, it provides no actual wetland ecological functions like storing surface water
and so does not count as a wetland. He has been only somewhat successful with the
courts, but has convinced the legislature to join his cause. In 2001, in legislation dubbed
the “Mel Stewart rule,” legislators added a sentence to the Oregon Revised Statutes at
196.825 (4): “Compensatory mitigation shall be limited to replacement of the functions
and values of the impacted water resources of this state.” The legislature told regulators
that they can only ask permittees to compensate for functions and values lost. If functions
do not exist, as Stewart claims for his piece of ground, permittees cannot be on the hook
for them.

5

Though called for in the 2008 federal rule, functions-based approaches were not novel then.
DSL’s own 1989 compensatory mitigation mandate calls for the agency to ensure that permittees
replace wetland functions. The agency has found itself relatively unable to follow through with
the goal. see also Dolan v. City of Tigard 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
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Figure 2.2a. Mel Stewart’s wetland. He argued it provided no functions, and in a series of
court cases, sued the state to shed any liability to compensate for it if he were to develop
it. Source: Jacob Gjesdahl and Aniko Drilik-Muhleck. November 2012.
DSL was thus in need of developing a way to assess functions in its mitigation
program. What regulators ended up with was the wetland functional accounting tool
called ORWAP (Oregon Rapid Wetlands Assessment Protocol). It is an extension of
author Paul Adamus’s previous work on Oregon’s ecosystem service calculators, which
in turn are based on work he did in the early 1980s for the Federal Highways
Administration to create some of the earliest wetland methodologies in the US. Adamus
says he was commissioned to do ORWAP specifically after the Oregon legislature in the
early to mid-2000s heard complaints about the way an older functional assessment
method called HGM (Hydrogeomorphic) classified different kinds of wetlands. HGM
was limited because each part of the state, with different kinds of wetlands, had to have
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its own version of the calculator. Legislators set out to mandate their own categorizations,
but Adamus and DSL were able to convince them that they could produce something that
would work for all of Oregon.
Just as DSL is on the hook for wetland functions, the agency needs a way to
assess stream functions. Adamus is also now working with EPA and WP to develop a
stream functional assessment for Oregon. The only major stream-related assessment
currently is the salmon habitat calculator, which generated the credits used in the HMLTHPRD trade. The history of the calculator parallels ORWAP’s basis in a transportation
agency’s demand for an assessment tool. A duo of consultants developed it in response to
the Oregon Department of Transportation’s (ODOT) need to assess impacts to salmon
habitat as it began a statewide bridge repair program in the early-2000s. ODOT wanted a
standardized calculator to be able to assess impacts quickly, holistically, and to get a
sense of their mitigation responsibilities statewide. In a series of weekly meetings that
lasted about a year, the consultants - now staff at the private engineering firm Parametrix
- sat down with research scientists and environmental agency representatives to figure out
how such a calculator would work. The Ecometrix calculator ended up as a
comprehensive site calculator covering not just salmon habitat but most any ecosystem
(Parametrix 2010). Only a few years later, in the COTE process, did participants pare
Ecometrix down to become the salmon habitat calculator used in WP protocols and in the
DSL-THPRD trade.
COTE was much like the stakeholder process of making Ecometrix. It was
convened in August 2008, a few months after the federal rule dropped. In the workshops,
participants agreed to move forward on several of the points the rule called for but which
had also been fomenting in the state. The overarching goal of COTE was to make
mitigation markets and other restoration opportunities work better for landowners,
somewhat along the lines of the federal rule’s directive to promote banking. The goal is
perhaps more in the vein of Enlibra, in that participants see the COTE project as moving
beyond the idea that resource stewardship is antithetical to development. Three specific
agreements coming out of COTE also showcased the Enlibra principles. First,
participants agreed to test out several functions-based ways of assessing restoration
success, including ORWAP and a version of Ecometrix that focused on salmon habitat.
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These new and improved assessments are supposed to make for better, science-informed
decision-making. Second, some agencies, like OWEB, are also interested in using
functional assessments as a way to decide whether funding particular restoration projects
is a worthwhile investment of public monies. Finally, COTE participants also agreed in
principle to a way of incentivizing bankers to do better restoration site selection. Site
selection is not so much an “objective data gathering” task so much as it is a “values”
approach to policy. The COTE incentive system establishes a “process for priorities” - a
way regulators can determine where in the landscape restoration is most needed and to try
to guide bankers there.
Nothing like COTE has taken place elsewhere in the country since the rule went
into effect in April 2008. The task of implementing the 2008 rules for the wetland and
stream market is very much a place-conditioned task (Doyle et al. 2013), and the right
things came together in Oregon. State agencies in Oregon already had a need for
functional assessment. Kitzhaber had championed a form of public-private governance
coming out of the stewardship conflicts of the mid-90s. As a consequence, Oregon has
grown to be a home for active and well-connected conservationist groups. These groups
have been successful in meeting the Oregon regulators’ need and desire for better market
metrics and protocols.

2.2b: Ecosystem Services - a Conversation on Conservation
Future work to grow ecosystem service marketplaces in Oregon will be made
possible and limited by contextual factors like the extent to which state institutional
funding trajectories allow agency staff to participate. But marketplace-making has been
and will be also shaped by the growing global discussion on marketizing ecosystem
services. In this section, I describe this conversation and the way it has formed over the
past 15 years or so. Leading advocates of ecosystem services management call for
“making nature’s values visible” as if they were just waiting “out there” as valuable
services ready to be accounted for (TEEB 2010). My point here is that ecosystem
services do not come out from nowhere, but are a specific kind of concept and practice.
The ecosystem services concept is a way of talking about nature that is distinctly
different from talking about nature as something to be set aside and preserved. It is a
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conversation about conservation that scripts nature as a sort of factory, one in danger of
closing up shop because people benefit from its output without paying. For
environmental economists (Costanza et al. 1997) and allied ecologists (Daily 1997),
ecosystem services refer broadly to the benefits to society which “flow” from nature. We
can look just slightly beyond HML for a good example: water temperature regulation. A
precursor to the WP’s work was a suburban Portland water utility, Clean Water Services
(CWS). In the early to mid 2000s, EPA imposed a TMDL, or “pollution diet,” on the
Tualatin watershed. Under the TMDL, CWS had to achieve certain reductions in stream
temperature, but a plant to chill their effluent would have been too costly. Instead, CWS
got permission from EPA to pay farmers elsewhere in the watershed to plant trees in
riparian zones that which would eventually shade and cool streams (Cochran and Logue
2011). The cooler water, then, provides a service to society by improving habitat for
threatened and endangered salmon.
Services, the story goes, must be measured and valued - often as a price - in order
to prevent their destruction and incentivize their stewardship. Three major waypoints
mark this line of argument. First was Costanza et al.’s 1997 work to price the world’s
ecosystem services (see also Daily 1997). For them, “Earth [is] a very efficient, least-cost
provider of ecosystem services” - to the tune of 33 trillion US dollars annually - much
like riparian trees were a least-cost provider of cool water in the Tualatin for CWS. The
UN’s Millenium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005 then called for a services approach for
assessing ecosystem change and implementing development projects. One of the most
important legacies of the MEA was in conceptualizing different kinds of services:
provisioning (e.g. genetic resources), regulating (e.g. water purification), and cultural
(e.g. aesthetic) services. Most recently, in 2012, Pavan Sukhdev’s The Economics of the
Environment and Biodiversity (TEEB) project was pretty much the only success story at
the global environmental sustainability conference Rio+20 (see also MacDonald and
Corson 2012). TEEB is a coalition of para-governmental authorities that produces reports
on and argues for measuring the value of nature as a way of convincing decision-makers
to prevent further species and ecosystem loss. At Rio+20, the TEEB team wrangled
world leaders into agreeing to an historic framework for national-level price accounting
of “natural capital”.
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Environmental economists argue that the best way for governments to establish
prices for natural capital are markets in which environmental goods and services are
freely traded. For them, markets most effectively provide information that dissuades
firms from resource impacts and prods others to invest in nature. “Markets send price
signals to people, it’s powerful. It’s like getting info for free,” is how Bobby McCormick,
professor of law at Clemson University put at one recent ecosystem services markets
conference. Most ecosystem services are, however, not traded in any open market, which
is why many environmental economists champion existing mitigation markets in
wetlands and streams. But in these markets, how regulators conceptualize the ecological
processes credits are supposed to represent is crucial since some kind of assessment of
restoration success is required to develop the credit as a commodity. Otherwise, all the
information about the wetland or stream commodity is actually for naught when the
purchaser - the permittee - finds out it has bought more of, less of, or something
completely different from what it bargained for (Boyd 2006; Boyd and Banzhaf 2006).
Without the right information, environmental economists argue, rational market actors
cannot work to preserve and allocate resources efficiently.
Much of the effort to construct a language of assessment for markets like
Oregon’s centers on three different terms: functions, services, and values. Functions are
ecological processes like surface water storage that are measurable by attributes like
percent of seasonal water extent. Parametrix’s development of the salmon habitat
calculator was largely a back and forth discussion over how to draw what are called
scoring curves which gage the relation between attributes and process performance (see
figure 2.4). Participants wondered whether, for instance, a habitat cover function ought to
score, say, a 30% or 40% for a given attribute. Attributes perform differently at different
levels. Attribute 2 in the figure below performs the best at just one specific level before
dropping sharply, while the relation of attribute 3 to functional performance is linear.
Regardless of how they perform, ecological functions may or may not do anything
useful for society. Services, however, are just that - the useful effect of some ecological
function on society. Surface water storage functioning may be an important component of
wetland health, but if the wetland does not also store and delay water and mitigate
flooding, it does not provide a service. Moreover, though functions may mitigate flooding
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for society as a service, that service may not be especially meaningful.

Figure 2.2b. How ORWAP separates out function and value scores. Attributes, like extent
of water storage and delay, receive both kinds of scores at three moments: the predicted
loss at the impact site; the compensation site (CWM) as it currently exists; the predicted
gain at the site from restoration. Source: DSL (2011).

Figure 2.2c. Parametrix’s scoring curves of functional performance. Some functions
perform linearly, parabolically, or otherwise. Source: Parametrix (2010).
A service becomes valuable the more it becomes useful to society, as when a
wetland stores water upstream of a housing subdivision situated in the 100 year
floodplain. In his work for the Federal Highways Administration in the early 1980s, Paul
Adamus first made what would become a lasting distinction between assessing ecological
functions and values. He recollects that at the time other calculators would claim that a
site was functioning well because, for instance, it was receiving a lot of nutrient inputs
from a nearby cow pasture that it could cycle and settle out. For Adamus, that is actually
a value - the site has a valuable opportunity to clean up nitrogen and phosphorous inputs
from manure, but that does not mean it actually is functioning in that way. The point is
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that these sorts of conceptualizations of the differences between functions, services, and
values have become necessary to trade a credit commodity in the market.

Figure 2.2d. Parametrix figure conceptualizing the relationships between attributes,
functions, services, and value in ecosystem services analysis. Source: Parametrix (2010).
Although the distinctions between ecological functions, services, and values have
been vital to how ecosystem markets operate, they are not set in stone. Rather, they are
the product of how ecologists like Adamus, economists like Sukhdev, and agencies like
DSL have felt the need to talk about ecosystem services. As such, functions, services, and
values will look or operate differently from place to place, even as the general scheme
stays the same. Projects utilizing the MEA approach, for instance, will likely put more
elaboration on what a service is (i.e. provisioning, regulation, or cultural). Functions,
services, and value constitute a language that allows regulators, policy-makers,
economists, and others to explain - for the market and otherwise - what an ecosystem
does. Importantly, this means services are not just out there waiting to be measured,
because services are as much ideas about how nature works as anything else. To get to
the point where Oregon regulators and conservationists were talking about functions,
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services, and values at COTE took the success of folks like Costanza et al. (1997), the
MEA, and TEEB, to elevate the conversation.

2.3: Making a Mitigation Bank
2.3a: Site Selection
In this section and the two that follow, I outline how a banker might develop a
bank to sell credits in Oregon’s ecosystem service markets, after the 2008 federal rule
and after the participants who wrote the COTE protocol attempted to implement the
rule’s directives. Before bankers can get lost in the debates about what makes their
mitigation credits representative of an ecosystem function, service, or value, they need to
find a site to do restoration. All else equal, restorationists will want to work where it is
cheapest to do so. In Oregon, they might look to lower-lying valleys with larger farms
and properties where most currently operational banks are situated, or they may be a
farmer already located there and looking to bank credits. Either way, this may not be
where conservationists’ and regulators’ think a bank would best suit the needs of the
watershed. HML, in contrast, is situated in the headwaters of the Tualatin River. The area
happens to be what regulators, with the help of some conservationists, have mapped out
as a priority location in the watershed.
One of the major goals of the COTE process was to develop a way of
incentivizing permittee and banker behavior to be more strategic about site selection. The
idea was to provide additional incentive to convince restorationists to do restoration
where they would not have done so otherwise. “Additionality” is key to many market
makers because to achieve an efficient outcome they want to pay only for the work that
any payment actually causes (Gillenwater 2011). Participants at COTE spent
considerable time mulling over how exactly to incentivize restoration siting. The
discussion focused on the use of trading ratios to encourage and discourage
entrepreneurs and developers. Trading ratios set the rate at which credits and debits are
allocated; restoration in a priority area, for instance, could earn more bankers credits than
elsewhere. Likewise, a developer making an impact in a priority area would have to buy
more credits. In theory, ratios can be even more complicated than this. An early proposal
for trading ratios at COTE would have incorporated information about the likelihood of
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ecological success for different kinds of restoration designs as a way of incentivizing
better design. Better designs would earn bankers more credits. The idea was nixed and
simplified, as participants acknowledged that such complexity in determining what
makes credits and debits could prove cumbersome to entrepreneurs and developers. Over
the course of the workshop process, participants ultimately settled on a market protocol
that aims for additionality only through location and timing of restoration and impact.
The site selection incentives that the COTE protocol put in play did not actually
play a part in how COTE workshop participants chose a site to test the protocol. DSL and
WP got lucky in finding a good site, rather than being motivated by the incentive of extra
credits. What happened was that the current landowner - a consultant and restorationist
himself - purchased the land in 2008 to start a native plant nursery with his wife. They
were looking to make some extra money off the land and just so happened to be talking
to someone from CWS about doing a riparian temperature project there. Their CWS
contact forwarded them onto DSL, which was looking for somewhere in Washington
County to invest funds it had collected from permittees who were able to buy credits
from DSL in advance of any on the ground restoration. The WP in turn found the site
from DSL. The landowner does not actually gain from any of the bank’s proceeds, but
DSL did purchase a conservation easement from them for their land.
Personal connections and trust are clearly vital to how water quality markets
operate (also see Mariola 2012b). Besides HML, I talked to three consultants doing bank
work in the Portland metro area and most of them relied upon social networks for their
business. In one case, the consultant had found a site through a personal contact; in
another, the regulatory agencies made the connection by recommending a landowner
interested in banking to the consultant. In the final case, the consultant only found a
willing landowner partner after sending out dozens of letters to owners with potentially
worthwhile sites. His work was well-planned, but lucky. It is the exception; most
landowners come forward to propose banking. HML’s owner was himself motivated and
already involved in restoration activities, unlike most farmers. Conservationists face
difficulties in enrolling landowners into operating private mitigation banks, in spite of the
rhetoric that the market is about duly rewarding them. As regulators and conservationists
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move to make banking more of a strategic decision, they will have to contend with its
very opportunistic nature.

2.3b: Assessment
However bankers acquire sites, once they have one they have to assess it before
they can earn credits. In early August 2012, I had the opportunity to visit HML with DSL
and WP staff in order to run wetland and stream function-based assessment methods. On
a typical Oregon summer morning - cloudy, opening to clearer skies - we ran through
questions in the ORWAP field component. The calculator is a multiple choice
questionnaire requiring the user to, among other things: estimate the amount of vegetative
cover on the site or possible upgradient and off-site sources of sediment influx. We
walked around a bit in order to get better or different perspectives on particular questions,
taking a rather leisurely three hours to work through the 140 or so multiple choice
questions. The goal ultimately with these assessment methods is to have two consultants,
with two days of training, capable of running them at a site in under two hours. The
approach promises to be positive for permittees and bankers, who do not want to spend
more time and money on assessment than necessary.
HML is the Oregon testing grounds for the new kind of wetland and stream
function assessment. For streams, functions “are the processes that create and support an
ecosystem.” (WP 2012, 1). Ecological function is a notoriously ill-defined term (e.g.
Fischenich 2006), but the most important goal of functional assessment is to gage change
over time. The idea is that functions in their natural capacity are “inherently stable and
resilient to disturbance because the functions at play are generally interrelated,
responsive, and unconstrained” (WP 2012). The goal then is to predict how restoration
efforts will perform in order to create those functions. That does not necessarily mean
coming back to the site year after to year to predict a trend, but rather taking focused
measures that can explain what ought to happen over time on the site. A good example
comes from the functional assessment for salmon habitat. That calculator asks the user to
count and measure large woody debris present in the stream and along the banks. It asks
the user to look at the banks as a way of getting at what pieces of wood could be recruited
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into the stream over time to provide habitat cover for salmon. ORWAP author Paul
Adamus describes something similar with wetland functions.
A site assessment of condition, on the other hand, is more focused on the
characteristics and structure of an ecosystem at a given point in time. A quick detour to
Ohio provides a good example. There, regulators have long been working to develop
assessments of stream and wetland conditions. Their efforts have focused in no small part
of the categorization and characterization of biological communities and their main
measure is one of indexed biotic integrity (IBI). Whereas a functional assessment might
just ask the user for an estimate of the percent ground cover of native species on a
wetland site, an IBI measure might ask for a more detailed characterization of the
different kinds of species that are actually there. As functional assessment guru Adamus
put it, condition assessment is taxing because it requires identifying, or “keying”
individual plants. It is potentially really involved for consultants on the ground.
Functional ecological assessment does have consultants doing work in both the
field and the office, but it may be less taxing than condition assessment. The first field
component of ORWAP, for instance, has users answering questions about seasonal water
extent, percent herbaceous cover during the summer, and soil composition, for example.
These methods are not necessarily as involved as sampling vegetation with the use of
random plots. Questions are often multiple choice. The ORWAP question about seasonal
extent of water has users choose between <5% or none, 5-25% of the assessment area,
25-50%, 50-75%, and 75+%. The second field form asks users to score the sensitivity of
the wetland to both internal and external sources of degradation. A typical question here
might concern the influence of upstream logging. The user would account for when
logging last occurred and how much of the wetland they thought the activity would
affect. The last portion of ORWAP, the office one, is similar in what it aims to capture. It
asks the user to employ several web-based mapping utilities from Oregon State
University and federal agencies, as well as other GIS to assess the landscape context of
the wetland. Is the site downstream of a quarry moving massive amounts of sediment
around, as HML is?
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Figure 2.3a. ORWAP spreadsheet. Source: Author
After answering all the questions, users look to the final scores. ORWAP
generates scores of functional effectiveness that are relative to other high functioning
wetlands in the state. Answering 95% on the question about extent of herbaceous cover in
vegetated parts of the site, would, all else being equal, give scores of 1.00 (or fully
effective) to aquatic invertebrate habitat and waterbird feeding and nesting habitat
functions. ORWAP provides two kinds of scores in the end, then. The first are functional
scores for 15 or so different functions, like water storage and delay and waterbird feeding
habitat. Excel then wraps these 15 different scores up into six grouped services scores by
taking the highest score from the set of functions that contributes to a particular grouped
service. For instance, the water quality group is determined by the maximum of the four
functional scores for sediment and nutrient retention processes.
Functional measurements do not in and of themselves make a credit or debit. In
ecological functions-based accounting, assessors do two rounds of calculations at the bare
minimum: a pre-impact or restoration assessment to establish a baseline and a second
round to evaluate the predicted impact or restoration result. The difference between the
predicted result and the baseline is the uplift or change in functional effectiveness and
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constitutes the quantity of credit or debit. Functional assessment seems simple and
straightforward, at least compared to condition assessment, but whether it will work for
consultants and the bankers they work for is still unclear.

2.3c: Marketing
As the 2008 final rule on mitigation from EPA and the Corps did make clear,
functional assessment methods are a preferable approach to overcoming the problem that
ratios present as poor proxies of ecological processes in determining how many credits
bankers get. In Oregon, crediting is currently based solely on a ratio of the acreage and
kind of restoration done: creation of a new wetland, restoration where one does not
currently exist but probably did, and enhancement of an already existing but degraded
one. As a testing grounds for functional assessment, DSL provides both functional and
ratio credits for sale from HML. The restoration design of HML is not any different
between the two, rather, the accounting is two-sided. There is not a ratios area of HML
and a separate functions area. Both kinds of credits are sold from the same part and
accounted for together. At HML, 9.3 acres were restored, nearly 1.5 were created, less
than .75 were enhanced, and about .9 acres qualified as buffer. That breaks down into
12.15 wetland credits for sale total off of the 24 acre site. A permittee does not have to do
this calculation; 10 acres of impacts simply requires 10 credits.
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Figure 2.3b. Wetland credit types at HML. The majority came from restoration of areas
that were likely once wetlands. Source: Author
(http://geo.usace.army.mil/ribits/index.html).
Ratios are proxies for the ecological processes restoration sites actually perform.
However, there is broad agreement among market actors that the ratio proxies are no
longer adequate proxies. Ratios may ensure a no net loss of acreage (cf. NRC 2001), but
cannot necessarily distinguish on the quality of the resource being lost. Moreover, as
regulator Bill Abadie put it, under a ratio system a banker could do “C” work on the same
number of acres as someone doing “A” work, but agencies would have to grade them
similarly and they would receive the same number of credits to sell. Even consultants
whose work revolves around bankers’ use of ratio credits agree. To consultant George
Kral, ratios are arbitrary: “What is three acres of enhancement, what is that? Why is
creation an acre and a half?” The response from regulators is to find a way of having the
actual hydrological, vegetative, or chemical improvements from banks and degradations
from impact sites stand in as the credit/debit. Hence regulators have pushed for functionsbased crediting.
Functional assessment allows regulators and bankers to generate more kinds of
credits. Refuged from a sticky midsummer 2011 day in a Madison, WI hotel conference
room, conservationists, regulators, and consultants from across the country took to
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debating the finer points of what counts as an ecosystem service credit. In a special
session on credit stacking at one of the premier ecosystem services conferences in the
nation, Devon Judge-Lord from the WP explained the possibilities and pitfalls of an
emerging practice where bankers sell multiple kinds of ecosystem service credits from
one restoration site. Currently, most mitigation banks in the US sell only one kind of
credit, like wetlands, streams, or species habitat. He explained that by stacking multiple
credit types at HML - not just wetlands, but water temperature and salmon habitat - they
are trying to drive investment to the “whole suite of functions” a site provides.
The idea with stacking is that bankers should be able to market as many credits as
there are actual environmental services. A site may have wetland, salmon, and
temperature functions that all share the same space. Most any segment of Roderick Creek
at HML is going to have salmon habitat, temperature functions, and riparian wetlands.
The difficulty comes in quantifying the ecological relationship between different
functions, like surface water storage, and their relative contributions to different services,
like salmon habitat or wetlands. Some functions are rather isolatable. Coarse in-stream
gravel, for instance, indicates potential salmon habitat, but probably has nothing to do
with wetlands. In an approach that did not allow multiple credits to be sold, or that allows
only one kind to be sold at a time, the cobble function could not be called out and
credited if the wetland already had. Bankers would have little incentive to restore the
stream on a site.
The practice of stacking becomes a problem when we look at functions that
contribute to multiple services. One of the functions underlying both wetlands and
salmon credits is surface water storage. Wetland vegetation and salmon both depend on
regular inundations of floodplains and the storage of water on these floodplains (Shreffler
et al. 1990). This kind of functional overlap becomes tricky in crediting because it may
cause a net loss of the resource. Suppose a developer wants to impact a wetland in
Hillsboro and comes to DSL to buy a credit from HML. If the Hillsboro developer buys a
wetland credit from HML, it has bought some claim on the ability of Roderick Creek at
HML to inundate floodplain wetlands, but it has also bought some claim on surface water
storage for salmon. If HML then sold a salmon credit to say ODOT, without changing the
available amount of salmon credits in its ledger, it would have sold some portion of the
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surface water storage functionality of the site twice. The result is a net loss, centered at
the mitigation site. It has not provided enough surface water storage to account for the
two impacts.
Some assessment tool authors, like Parametrix (2010) claim that the relationship
between two functions is perfectly expressible within the algorithms embedded in their
function-based assessment tool’s Excel spreadsheets. They are comfortable making a
claim about the exact amount a given ecosystem function, like surface water storage,
contributes to both salmon and wetlands. Under a Parametrix system, when the Hillsboro
developer buys a wetland credit from HML, DSL would only remove from sale the
number of salmon habitat credits that actually also contributed to the purchased dwetland
credit. If the surface water storage function contribute 75% to wetlands and 25% to
salmon habitat, DSL would remove a quarter of a salmon credit. This method allows
more credits to be sold, but is a strong claim about how salmon use floodplains in relation
to wetland vegetation.
COTE participants took a conservative route on stacking, assuming the
relationship between salmon and wetlands function is 1:1. If the Hillsboro developer buys
a wetland credit from HML, DSL would remove an equivalent number of salmon habitat
and temperature credits. But even claiming that shared functions contribute equally to
different services is still some assumption about an ecological relation. Stacking
problematizes environmental economists’ need to know where in nature ecosystem goods
or stocks end and ecosystem services or flows begin (Boyd 2006; Boyd and Banzhaf
2006). The degree to which an ecosystem is accounted for as more than the sum of its
parts when it is marketed in Oregon’s ecosystem services marketplace continues to be a
hot topic just as it is an unsettled issue for economists and other practitioners in other
markets (Dempsey and Robertson 2012).

2.4: Conclusion
As a USFWS staffer once summed it up for me, ecosystem service metrics “are
not developed in a vacuum.” To make a metric, representatives of agencies or consulting
firms or research institutes, all with specific institutional histories and interests, must sit
down together and haggle over the state of the science, statutory goals, and so on. They
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take part in a conversation on conservation, using the language of functions, services,
value, stacking, bundling. The seemingly straightforward market transaction in which
DSL traded THPRD four function-based salmon habitat credits from HML would not
exist without a plethora of regulatory apparatuses either: state and federal legal statutes,
administrative rules, court judgments on those rules, and staff interpretations. The trade
also demanded consultants who could perform the assessment work of judging
restoration success. In Oregon, ecosystem services metrics have been conceived of and
implemented through public-private partnerships, be it between watershed councils and
OWEB, engineering firms and public agencies, or conservationist groups and
environmental regulators. The nature of this work becomes problematic for the market,
which I demonstrate in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 3: State and Market Expectations of Ecosystem Services
As an attempt to price nature’s benefits, Oregon’s revamped market in ecosystem
services has achieved relatively little. My claim in this thesis is that right now new
measures and market protocols are not projects the state has successfully rolled-out as
novel or improved means for commodifying and accumulating services. Instead, this
move has had the effect of constraining the market. In this chapter, I revisit and expand
upon three moments in the HML-THPRD salmon credits swap to point to some key
tensions in the project of measuring and managing ecosystem services in Oregon. I argue
that different expectations actors hold for the market’s metrics and design are its
downfall.
When DSL traded away four salmon credits from HML to THPRD in late January
2012, agency staff also struck away a similar amount of wetland credits from the ledger.
This practice of stacking multiple kinds of credits from the same site has been of concern
to ecosystem service market makers across the country (e.g. White and Penelope 2013).
Some ecologists and agency staff suggest that if DSL were to trade a salmon credit to
THPRD and a wetland credit to a different developer, DSL might be selling twice what’s
in the middle - the functions, like surface water storage, that contribute to both salmon
and wetland credits. Because of this uncertainty, WP and DSL took a conservative route,
assuming the relationship between salmon and wetlands function is 1:1. But even the
claim that a shared function like surface water storage contributes equally to both salmon
and wetland services is some assumption about an ecological relation.
THPRD is not even impacting any salmon habitat. Its project is located in an
overgrown, unnamed tributary that is not known by authorities to be salmon-bearing
(Figure 1.1). What the salmon calculator really does is measure a set of stream functions,
like large woody debris recruitment, that are proxy measures for salmon habitat. No one
is actually counting salmon. The use of salmon credits in the trade was a way for
regulators to account for stream biological, physical, and chemical degradation rather
than habitat loss specifically. It was, as one regulator put it, “like swapping a Cadillac for
a Pinto” - that is, trading a high quality habitat restoration credit for a minor stream
impact.
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A month after the HML-THPRD swap was approved, a neighbor to THPRD’s
suburban trail extension sent off a polite yet insistent email to DSL’s director requesting a
hearing to dispute the agency’s permit allowing THPRD to impact the stream and some
wetlands with its trail bridge (DSL 2012b). She argued that THPRD’s functions-based
assessment of the impacts of the trail to the site was incomplete and inaccurate. In part, it
was incomplete because it did not capture her on the ground experience of flooding on
the site. To back her case, she had talked to natural resource consultants, who run
ecological assessments day in and day out. Consultants and the mitigation bankers they
work for are not adopting functional accounting methods like ORWAP even though
theoretically measuring and marketing functions - and not acres - would give them more
kinds of things to sell. If ordinary citizens are disputing the adequacy of functional
assessment, alongside the entrepreneurial actors it is supposed to benefit - why do state
regulators even bother ask consultants to measure functions and to what end?
What we see when we dig into the HML-Tualatin Parks trade are three moments
where regulators and consultants must come to terms on what extent and in what
character to account for ecosystem services in their assessment and trade. Leading
ecosystem services market advocate Pavan Sukhdev (2010), for one, realizes this when
he claims that “we cannot manage what we do not measure.” But the specifics of the task
are often ignored, as when Sukhdev plainly calls for “putting a value on nature.”
Ecological assessment is an art and science fraught with complexity and uncertainty.
Alongside geographers writing about the politics of “knowing nature” (Goldman et al.
2011), I argue that Oregon’s limited trade in new kinds of credits is a result of new
metrics and protocols not working for the right people. I show when and how regulators,
conservationists, and entrepreneurs agree upon approaches to crediting services. My point
is that their expectations of what nature can do in a market are themselves generative of
market outcomes (see Borup et al. 2006; Lave 2013; Randalls and Petrokofsky 2013).
Measures of salmon habitat that serve as proxies for stream functions prove adequate for
most regulators currently, though they won’t in the long term. At the same time, most
market actors are comfortable with WP’s conservative approach to selling multiple kinds
of credits. The big sticking point, however, is that consultants insist that functional
assessment is set to make them lose out, while state agencies expect to achieve better
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ecological accounting from it. Because everyone still agrees that the old accounting
method is unsound, the state may win some legitimacy in its effort.
That environmental policy is about “winning and losing” (Robbins 2011 [2004],
pg. 87) is no surprise given the research of political ecologists over the past 30 years
showing how third world peasants (e.g. Peluso 1992; Stonich 1993), inner city residents
(e.g. Heynen, Perkins, and Roy 2007; Truelove 2011), and the rural poor (e.g. Black
1990; McCarthy 2002) all can be marginalized from access to resources as a result of
policy. A large part of winning and losing out on nature’s benefits in these cases stems
from different “claims about nature,” or ways of producing, applying, and circulating
ecological knowledge (Goldman et al. 2011). Describing nature with indirect measures or
as a “stacked” set of functions is a project of creating environmental knowledge, but it is
not knowledge that is always created, circulated, and applied very easily. Rebecca Lave
(2012b), for one, calls for understanding the political economic forces motivating and
limiting the production of knowledge about ecosystems, rather than just the circulation or
application of such knowledge. Regulators’, conservationists’, and entrepreneurs’ high
hopes, indifference, and skepticism about what can be known about and done with
ecosystem services are shaped by the legal atmosphere they operate within, their view on
the state of the science, and fiscal constraints. Here, I ask, what are the political economic
imperatives which inform how Oregon regulators deploy assessment protocols and
ecosystem metrics? What keeps ecosystem functions-based environmental knowledge
from circulating? I focus on the contests over what comes to count as acceptable
environmental knowledge in Oregon and the disruptions in that process.

3.1: Stacking Ecosystem Services
Credit stacking and its opposite, credit bundling, are different ways regulators and
entrepreneurs conceptualize the relationship between the credit commodity and on the
ground ecosystem processes. Functions on a restoration site can be bundled together into
one “ecosystem credit” type or they can be parsed out into different kinds - wetlands,
water temperature, salmon habitat - and “stacked” as credits originating from a single
area. By assessing specific ecological functions, bankers can sell as many credits as there
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are measured processes, and regulators can know about the performance of each process
on the site.
If they are stacked on the same site, credits may share ecological processes and
this poses an economic and ecological problem. Ecologists are dubious that functions
shared by streams and wetlands can be written off as inconsequential, suggesting that
“you don’t mess with one part and nothing else is affected.” Economists as well worry
that in stacking credits the extent of overlap makes it impossible to properly account for
services. For them, markets require a well-defined commodity, but “nature does not come
prepackaged in units like cars, houses, and bread” (Boyd 2006, 716). Household or
regulation-based, car or credit, commodities can prove worthless if their purchaser finds
out they have bought more of, less of, or something completely different from what they
bargained for (Boyd 2006; Boyd and Banzhaf 2006). In a cap and trade system like the
one in which markets participants aspire toward a “no net loss” of wetlands and streams,
stacking multiple credit types to sell to different entities each requiring a credit to meet
the cap could “oversell” site-specific ecological processes (Cooley and Olander 2011;
Robertson et al. forthcoming).
My objective here is not to evaluate whether credit stacking at HML has been
ecologically detrimental. Instead, I talked to regulators, conservationists, and consultants
about their opinions on stacking in order to understand why they would do it and whether
and when it becomes problematic. National discussions about the theoretical pitfalls of
stacking have informed Oregon market-makers (and they in turn have led the discussion).
The risk of overselling resources is what drove the WP’s conservative approach to
stacking. DSL staff explained to me how WP stacking calls for a proportional, or 1:1
reduction of related credits when one kind is sold. At HML, when any kind of credit from
riparian “Zone One” (see figure x) is sold, DSL deducts every other credit available from
the zone proportionally because they are linked. Even if the WP protocols did allow for a
ratio that wasn’t 1:1, assessment tool maker Paul Adamus discusses the trouble with
gaging the interactions of stacked ecological indicators:
Adamus: Existing models can’t tell us how much increase in sediment retention
function in a wetland is going to cause a decrease in salmon habitat. We know
there’s a relationship there, but models can’t quantify it that exactly because the
supporting science itself is not that precise.
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Nost: Are you able to dig into the model and know that it counts for 80% of the
streams and 20% of the wetlands?
Adamus: Not yet. We are currently doing asensitivity analysis of ORWAP’s
models that calculate ecosystem services, but as you can imagine, it’s a
computing challenge because in order to capture the complexity present in nature
and the variation present across an entire region, some of ORWAP’s function
models have up to 40 contributing variables.
For Adamus, the interactions between all the model variables are difficult to
compute. However, the authors of the salmon calculator, Ecometrix, are more willing to
say they can measure these interrelationships. Theirs is a choice about what ecological
knowledge they can generate and what it can do for the market that, differing from the
close collaboration between DSL, EPA, and Adamus, has not worked for regulators.

Figure 3.1. Parametrix’s conceptualization of functional ecological interrelationships.
They claim that with their EcoMetrix calculator they can account for the precise
relationship between salmon, water quality, and wetlands, and therefore prevent
overselling resources. Source: Parametrix (2010).
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If stacking was potentially controversial, why did market-makers propose multicrediting in the first place? Derek Billings 6 at USFS is not a regulator, but he thinks a lot
about regulatory efficiency as well as landowner livelihoods. Playing a large part in the
discussion on stacking services in Oregon and nationally, he notes that stacking however conceptually difficult it might be - makes it easier for a landowner to get
involved in the market. It eases the number of regulatory “hoops” they have to go through
in order to sell more kinds of credits and so it encourages restoration of multiple
resources. He asks, “if you could get one set of protocols that would work for let’s say in
this case four different markets, why wouldn’t you?” This was a commonly heard refrain,
and the overture to the COTE process.
For one staffer from USFWS, regulations themselves are the problem yet to be
overcome in credit stacking. In her mind, the science on the interrelatedness of ecological
functions may in fact be settled, but stacking is about “more than just the science.” Even
though stacking credits can be beneficial, there are political and statutory limits to how
stacking can be implemented. She claims that these barriers may be particular to the
USFWS, however. Ranei Nomura, from the state DEQ, concurs. For her, DEQ is quite
willing to entertain stacking. She has to, in fact, because of the relative lack of
regulations. Nomura says she has no regulatory guidance or law to point to if, for
instance, a landowner wants to sell carbon credits in addition to temperature credits from
a riparian planting project. In this way, the regulatory “landscape” on stacking is uneven;
some agencies can do it while others cannot. Regulators’ general goal of establishing a
more encompassing set of metrics for restoration markets runs up against legal
constraints.
For several conservationists and regulators, the ideal credit is bundled, but again,
regulations prove to be obstacles. The ESA in particular is a tough mandate with which to
credit restoration because it emphasizes counting species rather than protecting habitats.
Sally Duncan, for instance, would like to see an “Endangered Habitat Act” that focuses
on ecosystem processes rather than restoring species populations per se. Likewise, for

6

Pseudonym. I have used pseudonyms for research participants who either did not respond in
timely fashion to my request to quote them or who requested anonymity.
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one USFWS staffer, who noted regulatory barriers to stacking, there are regulatory
barriers to bundling as well.
USFWS staffer: Yea ideally an ecosystem credit or a biodiversity credit would be
better. But if you think about this though - so let’s say there’s a sagebrush
ecosystem credit, you’d have to have a lot of people agree (laughs) on it including us, I mean everybody has needs for that metric....I mean the thing with
something like sage grouse and listing is time is short. We only have 2, 3 years to
figure something out or we’re probably going to list it. So and I think metrics are
a big part of that, I mean that’s where people are struggling. And it’s not just sage
grouse, it’s the whole sagebrush ecosystem, which is one of the most threatened
in North America, right? So ideally yea I’d love to see an ecosystem or
biodiversity credit or metric but I don’t know, it’s just, it’s somewhat out of my
scope and my agency’s scope. Which is a shame because it’s not. We’re
supposed to conserve ecosystems.
Limits on the scope of regulatory action - limits like the time and effort it takes to figure
out whether to list a species - are barriers to bundling a “biodiversity credit.” So too is the
fact that The staffer’s legal mandate is to protect specific threatened and endangered
species even if the agency’s overall mission is to conserve ecosystems. She pointed out
that:
USFWS staffer: When the rubber meets the road when you’re negotiating
mitigation or something, it’s about the species. Unless you’ve taken the habitat,
whether it is occupied, not, whatever - we have to tie it back to the species.
When asked about balancing between a metric for the species and a metric for the habitat.
Regulations as they exist can pose a barrier to what regulators themselves see as better
definitions of the credit commodity, be it bundled or stacked.
Some consultants also support credit bundling. Sean Pickles 7, for example, is
interested in instituting more comprehensive crediting requirements that would better
incorporate fish habitat and water quality metrics. He also has in mind a more expansive
temporal horizon for mitigation when he says he wants to see it done for the “the needs of
the future” at each site. Another consultant, Mike Allsworth 8, however, notes the
difficulty in such a sweeping vision. He supports the idea behind making a more
comprehensive credit and for restoring multiple resources, but argues that the bottom line
is bankers have to separate functions in order to get a sellable credit.

7
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Pseudonym
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Allsworth: Well that’s too ideal, I think it - to be able to do these integrated type
credits where you’ve got a forest credit that had everything, that had wet prairie
that transitioned to an upland savanna to an oak savanna to to forested. It
wouldn’t sell. It would just be too hard to market and there’s no driver. I think
that that could be taken into account when you’re planning that you actually you
know you take in those things into consideration but the only way you’re going to
measure things and provide credit is to have em be separated.
In other words, there are economic imperatives to what bankers want out of mitigation
metrics. Though perhaps ideal, an ecosystem credit would prove too costly.
Market actors’ perspectives on the problems and possibilities of stacking vary
greatly. They differ because stacking is in the end just as much one way of
conceptualizing ecological relationships as much as it is a technical protocol outlining
what credits can be traded in the market. Different market actors have different agendas
when it comes to deciding what ecosystem services credits any plot of ground can
provide - and with good reason. Entrepreneurs need to be able to do business, while
regulators find themselves needing to follow statutory mandates. But because of these
divisions, stacking is not going to provide a universal account of any restoration site. It
will not meet the goals of a regulator or consultant favoring the bundling of credits and at
the same time it might not be the perfect fit for the consultant or banker’s ecological
concerns. That said, there is a provisional consensus that the way the WP protocol
governs stacking and has been implemented at HML is a suitable way of bringing more
of nature into the purview of government, conservation, and business. It is exactly
because agency staff can push regulations only so far and bankers can do only so much
business with a bundled credit that they agree that stacking, for now, will work for the
market.

3.2: Crediting Salmon Habitat
“Every drop of water that hits the ground eventually becomes coho salmon habitat
(laughs), it just does.”
-Oregon environmental consultant, 7-18-12
Is good salmon habitat a function of the number of pieces of large wood debris in
a restored stream? Is it kcal/day of stream temperature reduced by riparian plantings? Or,
as one environmental consultant unwittingly suggested, should the object of concern
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actually be every drop of water? Regulating each drop of water could of course prove
politically and economically daunting, if not scientifically challenging. What are the
political, economic, and scientific limitations and opportunities to these definitions of
salmon habitat? Why did the COTE metric in particular come to work for the market?
Consensus among regulators, conservationists, and consultants that the COTE
metric can in fact continue to serve as the market’s salmon habitat credit commodity is
less likely to coalesce than the consensus on stacking. The few sales of salmon habitat
credits from HML have actually compensated stream function losses rather than losses of
habitats specifically. DSL and other regulators have been comfortable using the metric as
a way of accounting for biological, physical, and chemical stream functions - not just
salmon habitat. But in the long run, regulators are not keen on using what often gets
described as the overly-complicated habitat calculator for either habitat impacts or as a
stream measure. The agencies consider the salmon credit only a relatively decent proxy
for several of the things that make for a good stream, such as the presence of large woody
debris for in-stream fish habitat. It is too narrowly focused on things like diversity in
channel gravels that may not be important to good stream functioning outside of
providing salmon redds. Going forward with plans to develop a functional stream
assessment and crediting method, the agencies are reluctant to rely on the salmon habitat
credit commodity and are instead starting from scratch.
In the first place, the COTE salmon habitat credit has not even proven itself
adequate to the regulatory body charged with protecting threatened and endangered
anadromous fish – NOAA NMFS – because of the agency’s institutional position and
stance. Staff from NMFS actively participated in the COTE process where regulators and
conservationists approved the salmon habitat methodology. Exceptionally, the agency did
not sign on. As much as their sister agencies would have liked to have them at the table,
they have been reluctant to get into overseeing salmon habitat trading because of limited
staff time and resources to deploy to the issue. At least to the staff from NMFS that
participated, the COTE-approved methodology is a decent measure of salmon habitat. It
could be less of a black box and could emphasize the ways offsite and future conditions
affect restoration sites. But besides individual staff, NMFS as an institution did not want
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to unload another project. This was a major barrier to getting the salmon habitat metric to
work for a market in endangered anadromous fish.
Only recently has NMFS come around to condone trade in salmon habitat (NMFS
2013). The design of this market is currently ongoing, but NMFS has chosen the metric
that will define the credit commodity at the heart of the market. They did not go with the
COTE-approved metric, choosing instead one that they have developed in-house. It
remains to be seen if this metric will work for other agencies - if it even has to - or any
entrepreneurs that will decide to bank in salmon habitat restoration.
Before NMFS’s recent decision to support a salmon market, temperature credits
were supposed to do the work of recovering salmon habitat. In Oregon, the reason water
temperature is a listed TMDL pollutant that entities like CWS have had to deal with is
because of the negative effect warm water has on salmon. But in its mitigation work to
comply with the Tualatin Basin temperature TMDL, CWS focuses on lowering water
temperature by paying farmers to plant riparian trees rather than directly improving
salmon habitat. While many of CWS projects do include direct habitat improvements,
these improvements are not creditable under the TMDL because there is no reliable
metric to determine how much temperature is reduced. Much like staff at USFWS have to
bring ESA mitigation back to the species, Ranei Nomura has to implement a kcal/day of
water temperature reduced approach to comply with the temperature TMDLs. She has
been advised by legal counsel to focus on kcal targets and unable to ask directly for
biologically-based criteria for salmon habitat restoration.
Nomura: Unfortunately the way most of our state water quality criteria are set up,
it’s a pollutant by pollutant approach. Our temperature criteria to protect salmon
are for the most part numerical temperature standards rather than, for example, the
amount of quality spawning habitat we need to support the species. And, while
numerical temperature standards are important, they aren’t the whole story;
habitat improvements are also needed. Unfortunately, because of legal history and
focus on numerical criteria, we have to keep our focus on the number. A city
discharging treated wastewater with a thermal load has no direct impact to
salmonids and contributes a very small percentage of the overall thermal load to a
watershed, can come to me and say they want to offset their load by developing
two acres of great habitat for salmonids, which is what the fisheries agencies want
and DEQ also thinks is great idea, but I still have to ask them how they are going
to quantify the temperature benefits or kcals reduced from the habitat
improvements because of the way the temperature wasteload allocations are done
in the TMDL to line up with our temperature criteria.
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Agencies and their staff are often under statutory obligation to devise, implement, and
enforce proxy measures. The regulations stemming from the Clean Water Act make it
difficult if not impossible to directly restore salmon habitat, but temperature credits have
proven at least somewhat useful.
DSL, Corps, and EPA are not keen on using the salmon calculator for either
habitat impacts or as a measure of stream performance. Despite approving the HMLTHPRD trade, DSL is dissatisfied with the salmon habitat credit. The salmon habitat
calculator assesses Coho salmon habitat specifically, but many impact sites, like the
tributary at THPRD, are never frequented by such fish. DSL staffer Dana Hicks says that
in the three years since the COTE workshops, “the other thing I think we realized is we
need a stream functional assessment....you can’t really run the salmon metric run on
something that fish don’t even use.” For her it would be like trading a “Cadillac for a
Pinto,” or, in other words, high quality credit for a low quality debit.
Regulators consider the salmon habitat credit only a relatively decent proxy for
several of the things that make for a good stream, such as the presence of large woody
debris for in-stream habitat. It is too narrowly focused on things like diversity in channel
substrate composition that may or may not be important to a good stream functioning
outside of providing salmon habitat. The idea behind using salmon habitat for streams
came out of COTE, after NMFS did not commit to its use for ESA conservation banking.
EPA explains the tradeoff between adopting a general calculator that assessed a number
of kinds of stream functions and a specific, salmon habitat-oriented proxy. They are “not
quite happy with it,” but it is only in retrospect that regulators realize they may have done
themselves a “disservice” by focusing on salmon as opposed to a more general stream
metric. At one point, the salmon habitat metric was what they thought a stream credit
should be, but it turns out it will not be in the long-run.
The kind of credit agencies ought to employ is another question and open to wider
debate. Was THPRD’s stream impact best captured by a salmon habitat credit, or a more
general stream credit, or even a wetland credit? One banker thinks a wetland credit would
have been a better match, given the current kinds of credit types available on the market
and the nature of the impact:
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Banker: Well one thing that kind of frustrated me, because they [DSL] made a
salmon credit sale for a wetland, like the edge of a creek and then the creek
wasn’t salmon-bearing, so I was sitting there going, a better fit would’ve been
them to buy a credit from me rather than putting a salmon credit, or buying a
salmon credit for a non-salmon bearing creek.
What counts as nature’s benefits in these mitigation markets is up for question and open
to capture by different interests: banking, regulatory, conservationist. For now, for most
agencies, the salmon habitat credits will work for impacts to streams, and regulators are
in a better position to make that decision than one banker who has instead offered up a
wetland credit.
There have been several more trades of salmon credits to cover stream impacts
since DSL sent four to THPRD in early 2012. The swaps might be better than nothing,
even if they are not ideal. Going forward with plans to develop a functional stream
assessment and crediting method, the agencies are reluctant to rely on the salmon habitat
commodity credit and are instead starting from square one with the help of the WP.
Regulators would like to see a better fit credit, but may be in constrained in achieving
that. For now, they will deploy it.

3.4: Fighting over Functions
What regulators’ and consultants’ thoughts on whether to stack credits or to use
salmon habitat credits as indirect measures of stream quality point to is a bigger fight
over the implementation of ecological functions-based accounting. There is broad
agreement among market actors that crediting that is based on ratios of the amount and
type of restoration performed is scientifically unsound and in need of change. For
regulators, functions are the answer, and theoretically, entrepreneurial actors might
support functional accounting because it gives them more kinds of credits to sell. But I
show how and why consultants contest functional accounting. Their argument is that
ORWAP, as a functions accounting tool, is too subjective and does not give them the
results they would expect. In the previous chapter, I illustrated how in Oregon’s
ecosystem services marketplace scheme, market actors work to render nature useful for
the mitigation market with the help of digital tools like Excel and ArcGIS. But
spreadsheets and GIS layers do not necessarily make this work more accurate. The gaps
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and contradictions stemming from regulators’ and conservationists’ particular choices
about what to measure and how still exist and become problems for the market.
Consultants launch several critiques against functions-based crediting. In short,
they see ORWAP as not being able to account for their restoration work. Many find that
it is not sensitive or accurate enough to capture improvement in ecological functions. In
his office located just blocks from the A-Boy hardware store of Dolan v. City of
Tigard fame, I talked to consultant George Kral about the possibilities and pitfalls of
using functional assessment to get at a better equation of impact and restoration uplift. He
says ORWAP is not reliable. He tells me the story of how he had a consultant run
ORWAP at a mitigation bank in Washington County. While he expected to be able to
earn 42 credits from the 95 acre site under the ratios regime, the initial ORWAP result
gave him only 3.2 credits. After investigating the spreadsheet, he realized that his
consultant had made a different assumption about the hydrological condition on the state.
When the consultant ran it again with the corrected assumptions, he ended up with about
33 credits - better than 3.2, but still less than the expected 42. The lesson he took away
was that, “I don’t think that you would have two different practitioners take ORWAP to
the same site and come up with the same answer, running ORWAP. It’s just not going to
happen.”
The problem consultants have with ORWAP is not simply that it is an error-prone
way of assessing functions, but that functions may not be the best measure to begin with. 9
Only a little farther up the road from George Kral in Tigard, I talked to independent
consultant Sean Pickles about ORWAP. He says it is not sensitive enough to capture the
features of a site he thinks are important. Pickles questions whether ORWAP can capture
the functional uplift from sites that do not already have many wetland features, like a
variety of water regimes or vertical vegetative structure. He thinks it should be able to
show lift in turning non-native vegetation into native grass and forb vegetation. Likewise,
standing on the edges of the wetland at his new bank, consultant cum entrepreneur Jonas
Moiel tells me that some questions may be designed in such a way that inherently
prevents consultants from showing ecological change over time.
9

Even if it were, the fact that ORWAP is the standard for functional assessment in OR and that
consultants don’t buy into it means that - for all intents and purposes - there is a problem with
functions in general
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Moiel: There are questions in ORWAP such as: In the future how many trees will
you have that are a size class of 150 years old or older? These questions do not
pertain well to mitigation sites and are more suited for classifying existing
wetland areas. When performing the ORWAP analysis on the Tualatin Valley
Bank site we omitted questions like this from our analysis. The State and Federal
agencies questioned our approach and wanted all functions to be evaluated per the
protocol; however, we made the point that if the site was to be protected
indefinitely that in theory we would have trees that mature to 150 years old. The
point being that functional assessment methodologies have been developed to
evaluate existing wetland areas but not to compare the baseline conditions of a
mitigation site to the future predicted conditions. This is a major problem as the
wetland banking industry is at a point of flux between having banks create
functional credits rather than wetland acre credits. Currently, there are no
approved or scientifically backed methods for calculating functional credits in the
state of Oregon.
Moiel’s new bank is never going to be able to show lift in the question that asks about
150 year old trees. He suggests ORWAP’s temporal lens may not be sensitive enough to
capture short-term changes and calls for relying more on individual judgment of the
consultant or banker.
Regulators walk a fine line between the need to incentivize restoration while
asking for good mitigation practice from bankers. A quick detour away from ORWAP
illustrates this well. At a training session for an oak savanna functional calculator, fellow
attendees and I wondered why landscape features like the connectivity of the site to other
natural areas were weighted so heavily in the final score. The metric developer explained
that the scientific committee that had developed the calculator wanted to weigh it even
more because landscape context is so crucial to the success of habitat, but the WP vetoed
this idea because it would make it more difficult for bankers to make uplift if their score
was so influenced by surrounding properties. I discuss this landscape context issue at
length in the next chapter, but Moiel suggests that like the oak calculator’s far-reaching
spatial optic, ORWAP may be too far-sighted.
Sensitivity in measurement can be an influential factor in credit prices as well.
Returning briefly to the oak savanna training shows how. At the workshop, the trainer’s
mantra was that the oak calculator is a quick assessment and that we should not focus too
much on whether to score, say, vegetative cover as 25% versus 30%. Ultimately, the
overall score would not change that much. Eventually, the WP executive director had to
step in and caution that in a mitigation context, even a 1% change in the overall score
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from one question about vegetative cover can be meaningful. If the site is 100 acres, that
potentially makes for one credit lost. While the price for an oak savanna credit may not
approach the current average price for a wetland credit $70,000, the point struck folks
home.
The fact that functional assessment in general is sensitive and potentially costly is
explained by consultants when they talk about ORWAP’s difficulty in characterizing
their enhancement of wetlands. Unlike HML, where only less than an acre out of 24 was
enhanced, much of the current mitigation work bankers do is based on the enhancement
ratio. Because ORWAP is concerned with functions, it assumes that a site bankers will
only enhance by definition already has some hydrological functionality. This baseline
calculation makes it difficult to get an “uplift” or “delta” - the credit definition in a
functional crediting system. For consultant Brent Haddaway, the first thing that came to
mind about changing mitigation was the enhancement problem.
Nost: Last question: if you were president of ecosystem restoration and mitigation
here in OR, what would you change?
Haddaway: That’s a title? (laughs) (EN: It is now!) Um that’s a very good
question, I’m not a big fan of the - I guess it’s a pretty boring answer, but the
functions assessment method that they’re using to evaluate mitigation. I just
cannot accept the valuing all uplands as zero. It just, there may be legal reasons
for it - it’s just too - I think it skews your mitigation too wildly and too away from
enhancement.
Consultant Mike Allsowrth goes one step further to explain that the trouble with ORWAP
and enhancement is that it disincentivizes restoration of farmed floodplains, a favorite of
mitigation entrepreneurs in the area. Allsworth claims that ORWAP does not pencil out
for these projects and may cause many consultants and bankers to stop doing restoration
work.
Nost: In a situation where ORWAP is required, do you think that you know, with
an emphasis on function Allsworth: It won’t work, it won’t work. It doesn’t work. I guarantee you it
doesn’t work because I’ve done it on a number of sites where we’ve applied
ORWAP and on a farmed wetland, pick any one you want - on a farmed wetland,
we can’t enough lift to get our - and we come back to this: we have to have - most
of the sites that I’ve looked at, we’ve had to have 6-10:1. It doesn’t pencil out.
You can’t cover your costs - if you have to go out and buy 7 acres of farmland
and you can generate 1 credit, at 50-60000 dollars, it doesn’t pencil out
financially, it won't’ work. and it doesn’t work and it’s not working.
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As a tool for assessing functions, ORWAP’s misses can be costly.
The HML pilot has also demonstrated that functional assessments will result in
fewer credits for bankers to sell, and thus higher prices for permittees in need of credits.
Kirk Jarvie from DSL notes that the move to functions will be costly in part because
unlike ratios they do not provide certainty to bankers like Kral “from the get-go” that a
given acreage can be developed into a number of credits. Regulators recognize that
devaluing the ratios-based currency will be difficult. Yvonne Vallette at EPA puts it well:
Vallette: Problem is that we had developed a fairly elaborate wetland
methodology but now we had a full marketplace that had been established on a
very different currency (laughs). So now we’re hoping that by having something
like COTE established, we’ll be able to speak in this money terminology that
people can understand. We were hoping to be able to make this transition from an
old accounting method to a new one and it’ll just be a matter of figuring out some
kind of conversion factor for the old to the new...people don’t want to feel as
though the value of the currency that they have now is gonna be deflated because
all of a sudden we’re going to Euros (laughs).
Vallette realizes bankers’ uncertainty about how their current projects will be able sell if
their currency is deflated. But for her, a functional credit is a better credit, even if it costs
several hundred dollars more than a ratio credit, as it does at HML.
Still, because no one is compelling permittees to buy functional credits yet, the
only wetland credits that have sold from HML have been ratio ones. While DSL’s rules
require entrepreneurs to conduct a functions-based assessment for some parts of the
mitigation process, they are not yet requiring functional crediting, as much as they would
like to. Kirk Jarvie from DSL elaborated that:
Jarvie: The saving grace is that uh it is, [functional accounting] is very
consistent with what our statutory obligation is right now and the current
method is not. So the great news is we can always point to statute and say,
you know, we’re doing this to fulfill what we probably should’ve been
doing a long time ago and this is what statute envisioned, at least in
theory.
Moving forward, the justification in the language of the law is important because it gives
regulators something to reference if consultants complain.
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Figure 3.4. The number and type of mitigation banks opened each year in Oregon.
Source: RIBITS (http://geo.usace.army.mil/ribits/index.html)
Developing a new currency is a project for another grant, regulators say. Yet the
functions fight may be coming to a head, with talk of a lawsuit against any attempt by the
state to mandate functional crediting. Bankers may stop investing in new restoration work
and indeed market growth in recent years has slowed somewhat (see figure x). In Oregon,
banks typically take about two years to go through planning, approval, and
implementation and so the explosion of new entrepreneurial banks in 2011 were already
in the works before COTE and functional assessment were finalized. What the functions
fight shows is that the project of measuring nature’s benefits for the market is not an
exercise in revealing nature’s “true values,” and not apart from business imperatives nor
regulators’ and consultants’ ideas about what accounting techniques are most
ecologically appropriate. Consultants do not think ORWAP captures functional uplift and are skeptical of uplift as the target - while agencies think ORWAP and functions
provide a “higher and better” approach.
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3.5: Expectations
It may be easy for someone like Pavan Sukhdev to advocate for ecosystem
services accounting on an international stage and see ecosystem services as out there, just
waiting for policy-makers, scientists, and corporations to reveal their “true values.” After
all, the goal is to “make nature’s values visible” (TEEB 2010). But ecosystem services
markets on the ground require the production and circulation of knowledge about services
- a task riddled with uncertainty (Dempsey 2013; Johnson 2013), informed by policy
directives (Lave 2012a,b), confronted by unwilling scientists (Robertson 2006) or
regulators (Robertson 2010; 2012b), and so on - and more often than not, not everyone at
the table demands the perfect measure. To understand why some credits or protocols do
end up working for the market, I draw on an STS literature (Brown and Michael 2003;
Borup et al. 2006; Lave 2013; Randalls and Petrokofsky 2013) to develop a way of
talking about what regulators, conservationists, and consultants come to expect out of
credits. This is a question of the adequacy of ecological metrics, for whom, and in what
context. Some measures, in some situations will allow the market to run smoothly
because they meet everyone at the table’s expectations of what nature can do, what the
credit can do, and what stakeholders themselves can do. Likewise, other measures, in
other situations, do not meet expectations.
My turn to expectations is a call is to clarify and re-articulate what political
ecologists and economic geographers mean when we talk about ecological crisis and their
fixes (Bakker 2009; Castree 2009) or the role “materiality” plays in shaping market
outcomes (Boyd, Prudham, Schurman 2000; Bakker 2005; Sneddon 2007; Bakker 2009).
Bumpus (2011, 630), for instance, concludes his study of the production of carbon
dioxide offsets by claiming that: “the material nature of carbon reductions and the social
relations in which these [offsets] are governed, argued, negotiated and enacted are
dialectically related to the broader requirements of the new and evolving carbon
economy.” He draws on the work of Bakker (2005) to emphasize several of the “inherent
difficulties” (628) carbon market actors face in using existing technologies to measure
different kinds of greenhouse gas emissions for crediting purposes. In Bakker’s
groundbreaking take on Britain’s privatized and commercialized system of water
distribution, she argues that water made for an “uncooperative” commodity because
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water districts were unable to effectively trade it with one another. For her, water’s bulky
volume and natural inclination to flow downhill explains why its commodification was
unsuccessful and productive of a crisis. Yet, I would add that, as Robertson (2012a) puts
it, this “‘uncooperativeness’ only appears within the context of specific social projects
which require cooperation.” In this sense, what makes Bakker's claim resound is that it is
contextual; water was uncooperative in this case because it did not meet the expectations
of Britain’s privatized municipal water companies to travel between watersheds. One
could imagine that they could have trucked water across watersheds and between cities,
but this would likely have been costly beyond what they imagined reasonable. As
Robertson (2012a) concludes, “‘materiality’ may be the answer, but perhaps not for
material reasons.” What regulators, conservationists, consultants, or other market actors
make out of nature’s materiality is what matters and we need to be able to articulate those
expectations and when and how they are met or failed. Otherwise, we miss out on who
wins, who loses, who is responsible for those outcomes, and why.
Throughout all three moments of the HML-THPRD trade, regulators’,
conservationists’, and consultants’ expectations of what they and nature can do are
sometimes achieved, sometimes missed, and sometimes somewhere in the middle. There
is good reason to think that stacking multiple kinds of credits on one mitigation site might
lead to an overselling of ecological processes. After all, ecology is supposed to be a
science of the holism of parts. At any rate, it is certainly a complex and uncertain task to
parse out those ecological relationships. But this has not prevented market actors in
Oregon from stacking wetland and stream credits. For many regulators, bundling may be
a better way to account for ecological interrelationships, but it does not meet political
(statutory) or economic expectations (sellable credits) for actors. Bundlers are willing to
concede on the issue and so there is a working agreement among regulators,
conservationists, and consultants, that nature can be parsed into functions. The consensus
is that the WP protocol on stacking is an adequate approach to crediting ecosystem
services Oregon.
Salmon habitat is in a sense “uncooperative” as it has proven resistant to
regulators’ and conservationists’ attempts to metricize it. But it is resistant in Oregon
only because, first, decision-makers at NMFS themselves have been resistant to the idea
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that salmon habitat is something that can or should be traded, if only because that would
mean more work for the agency. Second, water is uncooperative because the way the
authors of the salmon habitat calculator conceived of streams cannot work for the CWA
agencies (Corps, DSL, and EPA) that are now trying to develop a more comprehensive
stream metric. Their expectations of what materialities a stream water quality should
reference are different than what the salmon habitat commodity credit currently
references. There is nothing per se about water in this case that would otherwise prevent
the creation of salmon habitat or streams as things to be sold. HML may lay claim to the
first salmon habitat bank in the nation, but streams are regularly traded elsewhere in the
country (Lave et al. 2008). Indeed, DSL is trading salmon habitats for streams because,
although their long-term expectations are not yet met, the metric is adequate for now.
Functional accounting of ecosystems is not without controversy. Regulators think
that restored wetlands and streams provide a set of functions that can be measured and
circulated as credits. Consultants may or may not agree, but the bottom line is that
functions, as gaged by ORWAP, simply do not meet bankers’ expectations about the
amount of ecological uplift they achieve in their restoration work. Functions, at least for
now, do not give bankers what they need. Bankers make the question of whether
functional calculators better capture restoration efforts out to be: what aspects of the site
are and are not captured and for whom? They argue: only parts, and not for them.
Functional accounting does not tell them about what they would want and expect to know
about vegetation and hydrology, and it does not give them the number of credits they
would expect either. This is a costly unexpected consequence for them. And this is why it
pays for political ecologists and economic geographers to pay attention to expectations.
Because regulators have high hopes for functions to replace what everyone agrees is a
broken ratios system that no longer meets most expectations, their claim gains more
legitimacy.

3.6: Conclusion
Political ecologists, resource geographers, and scholars of neoliberal natures can
draw upon work in STS on expectations to understand the design and implementation of
new and expanded environmental markets. There are a couple insights my own case
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provides into how they might do so. Many STS scholars have focused their attention on
the promises made by promoters of new technologies like xenotransplantation (Brown
and Michael 2003), biopharming (Milne 2012), underwater logging (Randalls and
Petrokofsky 2013) or even stream restoration (Lave 2013), and the “performative” work
of such promises. Heeding actors’ expectations can more broadly explain why
(conservation) market projects, plans, and designs succeed and fail. Related, expectations
are “generative” not just of consensus and legitimacy, but conflict, because they are
politically and economically situated within particular market subjects (cf. Starr and
Griesemer 1989).
What matters for the Oregon ecosystem services market when actors stack, deploy
proxy credits, and generate functions-based credits are regulators’ and consultants’
expectations of what can be done with knowledge about nature within the market context.
There is a consensus between regulators and consultants on stacking in spite of potential
economic and ecological consequences, because statutory barriers prevent better options
and because stacking may prove to be a more holistic approach to restoration accounting.
The salmon calculator has not met the expectations of the salmon regulator, NOAA
NMFS, for a market in habitat conservation, nor has it met the long-term expectation of
CWA section 404 regulators to serve as a stream functions proxy. In the meantime, it will
do for trades like the one which credited THPRD’s trail impact. Functional accounting,
however, is not proving adequate. Regulators have great expectations that it will provide
a better credit, but consultants do not see it as economically advantageous. This puts
regulators and consultants at cross-purposes, but regulators may win out because their
expectations about the ability to measure ecological functions are legitimated as a claim
to get beyond the broken ratios system.
One of the world’s foremost advocates for ecosystem services, Pavan Sukhdev
(2010), has called for getting the price of nature’s benefits right lest they be mismanaged.
My point has been that underlying this price measure are ecological assessments that are
not technical problems as much as they are social ones. I have explained how regulators’,
conservationists’, and consultants’ interests, motivations, and expectations of what nature
can do influence the success of a market in environmental services. The limited success
of the Oregon market is not a product of missing nature’s “true values” but of not getting
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that measure right for bankers (functions) or regulators (salmon habitat). In the next
chapter, I hone in on how these measures also generate spaces for restoration that serve
the purposes of the state more so than consultants.
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Chapter 4: Putting a Value on Nature
In this chapter, I argue that how regulators, conservationists, and bankers in
Oregon plan for, choose, and evaluate locations that enter the market as mitigation
banking restoration sites proves to be market-constraining, but perhaps only in the shortterm. As we saw in the previous chapter, one of the neighbors to THPRD’s trail extension
has disputed the permit approval allowing THPRD to impact a stream with its trail bridge
(DSL 2012b). The neighbor’s cause for concern was partly that the functions-based
assessment of the site was inadequate, but also that DSL had not properly asked THPRD
to avoid or minimize its impacts before allowing the entity to compensate for them. One
reason citizens and non-profit groups like The Nature Conservancy (Wilkinson et al.
2009) pressure regulators to get developers to first avoid and minimize impacts is that the
use of mitigation banks to offset wetland and stream impacts has the effect of transferring
localized ecological processes to distant restoration sites (BenDor and Brezovic 2007;
BenDor, Sholtes, and Doyle 2009). In mitigation banking, streams and wetlands that
developers pave over in suburban Portland are restored and credited in other parts of the
broader Tualatin River watershed. The distance between HML and THPRD’s unnamed
stream tributary may only be 16 miles as the crow flies, but more importantly, the two
sites occupy very different points within the watershed network (see maps in Chapter 1
and below). Ultimately, they are equally part of the Tualatin watershed, but the tributary
and the creek it flows into before reaching the Tualatin both provide important services
for Beaverton, a Portland suburb. At HML, the stream credits may represent a higher
quality resource than that destroyed at THPRD, but they are specific to Roderick Creek
just before it enters Gales Creek.
Here I show how Oregon’s regulators, conservationists, and entrepreneurs design
and implement assessments and rules that provide some means of accounting for the
spatial embeddedness of ecosystem service provision. These measures of what in
regulators’ and conservationists’ logic are location-dependent ecological values,
however, prove problematic for entrepreneurial banking practice. The work of “putting a
value on nature” (Sukhdev 2010) in Oregon’s ecosystem service marketplace is not as
uncontroversial as simply pointing to places on the map might seem. Disagreements
between regulators and bankers’ consultants take center stage, as where to do restoration
72

becomes another facet of bankers’ hesitations about the deployment of functions-based
assessment. I argue that the spatial logics of these assessments and other market protocols
have proven obstacles to a robust market. Two of the primary motivations for the COTE
process and the 2008 final rule were to facilitate watershed planning and promote
mitigation banking, both of which appear to be a revamping of the market to better
commodify and commercialize wetland and stream ecosystems, and ultimately foster
capital accumulation. My claim is that these are in fact constraints to the market. They
may prove to be short-term only, however, as in the long-run bankers might adjust to
regulators’ expectations about where they want them to do restoration.
That market actors in Oregon are eager to articulate the “value of nature” comes
as no surprise given the work of political ecologists to depict the triumphs and travails of
surplus value-seeking capitalists as they confront the environment (Robertson 2000;
Lansing 2011; Ernstson 2012; Robertson 2012b). In suggesting that the planning,
choosing, and judging of restoration sites across the landscape for the market is what
constitutes this pursuit for value in Oregon, my argument contributes to a literature on the
ways states, at particular historical-geographical moments, come to hold power and
legitimate what are often non-market goals through spatially-explicit strategies to
organize nature (Whitehead et al. 2006; Asher and Ojeda 2009. I argue that the ways
Oregon regulators - with the help of conservationists - plan for where restoration occurs
can be means to state power and legitimacy vis-à-vis entrepreneurial market actors. This
is a response to the call from Corson, MacDonald, and Neimark (2013) to detail the
social relations and metrics that constitute new markets in conservation. I have found
there is good reason to pay attention to the spatial logics and social relations that matter
over time in such markets. To show why, I first illustrate different ways market advocates
and actors in Oregon think about the spatial nature of ecosystem service provision. These
logics revolve around a service’s opportunity or constraint to perform some valuable
benefit for society.
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4.1: Spatial Logics of Ecosystem Services
4.1a: Opportunity and constraint as ecosystem service value
Back in Tigard, consultant Sean Pickles tells me about what he sees as the goal of
wetland and stream restoration and he emphasizes the importance of the placement of
projects. Tucked into an easy-to-miss corner of a grocery store parking lot sits a small
stream-side wetland (see figure 4.1 below). At first glance, it seems out of place. When
the shopping mall was built in the early 2000s, environmental regulators had allowed the
owners to compensate for paving over other wetlands on the property by restoring
existing wetlands on the site, rather than purchasing a credit from a bank. The wetland
provides benefits to Tigard and the metro area in the form of storing and delaying
floodwaters and allowing nutrient assimilation processes to occur naturally instead of in
expensive water treatment plants. In general, for ecosystem practitioners and researchers
alike, wetlands and streams present “capacities,” or opportunities, in providing services
that society values. These opportunities - and constraints - to provision are to a large
degree a matter of proximity (see e.g. NCP 2013). Restoration work that meanders a
small headwater stream in the middle of nowhere offers relatively little opportunity to
mitigate flood damages, while the stream might provide excellent opportunity to restore
salmon habitat. Likewise, a wetland in Forest Grove does not provide the same
recreational opportunities to Tigard residents, though perhaps migratory bird habitat or
carbon sequestration functions do not need to be specifically located in Tigard.

74

Figure 4.1a. A wetland mitigation site in Tigard, OR. Source: Author.
Regulators, conservationists, and consultants in Oregon talk about the opportunity
and constraint for an ecosystem process or function to deliver some kind of benefit as a
value. It is unclear where this specific way of conceptualizing ecosystem process
originates, but internationally it has become a sort of lingua franca. Contributors to one of
the keystone texts of the ecosystem services approach, Gretchen Daily’s 1997 edited
volume, Nature’s Services, did not dwell on the relationship between the context of
ecosystem service provision and its value (Daily et al. 1997), but by 2013, the scene was
different. By then, Daily could declare that “We need to be able to pinpoint places on the
landscape … and say these places are really the most important for supplying these
benefits” (Hoff and Daily 2012). Likewise, the authors of a recent TEEB report on the
value of wetlands named “Geospatial mapping [as] a powerful instrument to demonstrate
where the source of value comes from (i.e. the location and the extent of water and
wetlands resources)” (Russi et al. 2013). Ecological economists are also increasingly
interested in how the spatial arrangement or character (Newell and Swallow 2012) and
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the landscape location (Ruhl et al. 2009; Womble and Doyle 2012) of ecosystem services
contribute to how valuable society finds them.
In Oregon, service-as-value thinking cuts across different kinds of market actors.
Yvonne Vallette, a regulator, notes how restoration sites that can deliver multiple
resource types present an opportunity.
Vallette: So again, if you can find a site that can accommodate both needs, like
it’s got some great opportunities for stream rehabilitation and some riparian
establishment that helps not only on-site functions but off-site as well. Even a
wetland can help for some additional water quality plus storage. And you can add
a value to all of that. That’s huge.
Wetland, stream, and riparian restoration work on a single site makes for a “value-added”
mitigation site because it improves multiple ecological components like water quality and
storage on and off site. Mike Allsworth, a consultant, also describes opportunity as
ecological. His concern centers on what can constrain, “influence,” or “stress” a site, such
as the nearby presence of invasive species like reed canary grass. He notes that the bank
development and regulatory decision processes need to account for site stressors.
Ecological or otherwise, value itself is a term that is not defined in law, but in regulatory
memos DSL refers to wetland value in particular as, “the importance or worth of a
wetland function to societal needs. This includes public attitudes and the [wetland’s]
opportunity to provide a given function based on its location” (DSL 2011).

4.1b: Three spatial logics of ecosystem services
I propose that there are three spatial ways of thinking about the restoration of
ecosystem services which all play off the opportunity and constraint definition of
ecological value and which inform site selection in Oregon’s market. They are not wholly
separate logics, but more like interwoven strands of thought. First, there is what might be
called an eco-regulatory logic. Regulators at the state and federal levels argue restoration
sites should be located in such a way that enhances their ecological success and also
achieves the programmatic goal of “no net loss.” For them, the banking of credits at one
site, to be sold to many development projects, is a reaction to “postage stamp mitigation”
in which restorationists built smaller mitigation projects across the landscape that were
ineffective because they were easily influenced by surrounding land use. In a way, their
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view draws off of Island Biogeography Theory (see Laurance 2008), whose adherents
theorized that larger islands of conservation proved more resilient to species-endangering
habitat fragmentation.
The second spatial logic of ecosystem services is a way of reasoning about nature
and space that is focused on economic efficiency. For environmental economists,
equimarginality describes a spatially efficient scenario where, across all relevant firms,
every extra dollar spent on pollution abatement or conservation fails to return more than
dollar's worth of pollution reduction or habitat protection. If "command and control"
mandates requiring each firm use the "best available pollution abatement technology"
fail, it is because - the story goes - these policies do not acknowledge the fact that each
factory or wastewater treatment plant or housing developer has unique cost schedules for
managing their external costs to society (Field 2010; see also Polasky et al. 2008). Some
firms can mitigate emissions, effluents, or habitat impacts more easily than others. The
implication is that where polluters do mitigate or compensate entrepreneuring
restorationists for impacts will be where it is least costly for them to do so. This logic
partly underlies the regulatory one as well. The very idea of building a bank instead of
mitigating on-site reflects the idea that developers deserve spatial flexibility. The
question is, where does the bank go? All else equal, if given the flexibility a suburban
Portland housing developer needing to abate a subdivision’s impacts on salmon habitat
will do so where it is easiest to. This is probably outside of the urban growth boundary
where land is less expensive anyway and where the demand for housing is not as
pressing. The choice may or may not have anything to do with the quality of habitat
there.
In a third logic, conservationists instead argue for planning restoration in specific
sites where it can be most efficient (Kiesecker et al. 2009; Kiesecker et al. 2010). This is
much like the previous logic, but does not assume an equal playing field among sites.
Many conservationist non-profits also want the most bang for their buck, while realizing
the economics might not always work out. They want to focus the limited supply of
restoration dollars in “opportunity areas” and other places they deem critical habitat.
They wish to improve already existing ecosystems, while limiting development of those
areas as well. And while those drawing on the eco-regulatory logic see value in a larger
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site, conservationists also see value in larger projects, but on particular sites. To achieve
this goal they map priorities and work to incorporate conservation planning into
regulatory decision-making. Besides promoting banking, the 2008 final mitigation rule
also called for a “watershed approach” to mitigation. The approach has Corps and EPA
consider watershed plans - including those drafted by conservationist groups - when
evaluating entrepreneurs’ proposals to bank. As the rule noted, what counts as a
watershed plan and how to deploy them is still up to each Corps district’s chief engineer,
and by extension, regulatory staff. In the next section, I dive into whether and how they
do in Oregon.

Figure 4.1b: Mitigation banking in Washington County. Dots represent locations of
impacts and are color-coded with the banks they have purchased credits from. The
Tualatin River basin defines the extent to which the three banks can sell credits, but
pictured are smaller sub-basins and the urban growth boundary. Source: Author.
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4.2: Three Moments in the Measure of Value
In Oregon, the three strands of logic which suggest where and how restoration
projects should be sited inform three different moments where regulators,
conservationists, and bankers plan for, choose, evaluate restoration for the ecosystem
service marketplace. These moments are where landscape ecological data are produced,
become economically and legally meaningful, and the state, conservationists, and
entrepreneurs negotiate where restoration gets done (or not). Here, I set up some of what
the tensions between regulators and entrepreneurs are - at least theoretically - and flesh
them out in the following section.

4.2a: Assess
The first moment of value’s measure comes when consultants run credit
calculators on a restoration site. These calculators contain both field and office-based
components but questions in both parts ask assessors to gage the ecological context of the
site. On the ground, this means scanning the horizon to think about potential future
impacts to the site. In August 2012, when I had the opportunity to run ORWAP at HML
with DSL, we spent a good chunk of time looking beyond the site boundaries to speculate
on how much the giant scar in the side of nearby hills - a rock quarry - has and would
stress the site and risk its ability to perform functions. Back in the office, one of the key
mapping utilities consultants employ for the ORWAP assessment is the Oregon Explorer
(OE)(Figure 4.3). OE gathers a lot of data from outside the site together and displays it to
the user in one frame. Consultants have to answer questions about landscape context by
using OE to, for instance, draw a two mile radius circle around the site to see how many
other similar habitats the site is connected to in the area, or what sources of ecological
stress are nearby, like the quarry at HML. The key point here is that the value score of a
banker’s site is relational to the site’s surroundings, yet these are often habitats and
properties which the entrepreneur has no or little control over. This calculation of values
“comes in at the 11th hour” after ORWAP scores ecological functions, as the program’s
author notes. They are scores on a 1-10 scale which portray the relative opportunity for
each function to occur.
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Figure 4.2a. Oregon Explorer. Consultants use the online mapping tool to assess the
landscape context of a restoration site. Source: http://oregonexplorer.info/
4.2b: Regulate
Do regulators consider offsite constraints and value scores when they assess
consultants’ monitoring reports or bank prospectuses? The short answer is yes, and that is
exactly why those questions are there. The longer answer is that regulators’ approaches
are more fractured. Bankers have to develop and get agency approval on performance
standards, or criteria of success, that determine when and if they actually receive their
credits to sell. Regulators have an opportunity to account for the value of a site in
defining performance standards, and this constitutes one of three parts to the regulatory
moment of value’s measure. At HML, for instance, the quarry upstream is one potential
stressor to the site’s performance, but regulators decided that they were comfortable with
its presence. In general, then, there is a risk that offsite conditions will change over time
and affect the site. Regulators have a legal basis for influencing where bankers decide to
site their projects, one that is based on the value of different functions’ performance in
relation to this offsite future. But agencies may or may not decide to take any action on a
case by case basis.
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How regulators classify and categorize different ecosystems across the landscape
is the second part of the regulatory moment of assessing the value of sites. Agencies
categorize different kinds of wetlands in particular in order to assess their value relative
to other wetlands (Robertson 2012b; stream categorization is in the works alongside a
stream functional assessment). In Oregon, there are different types of wetlands and some
are more common or rare than others. In parts of Oregon as elsewhere, forested wetlands
have been partially replaced by farmed wetland. There is no direct relationship between
abundance and value, however. The point of categorization is to be able to compare
across all class types of wetlands - to know that a forested wetland is in fact different than
a farmed one. A key purpose of ORWAP is to allow comparisons among different kinds
of wetlands. Before ORWAP, there were a variety of assessment methods and most were
specific to only a few wetland types or regions of the state. That was unacceptable to the
Oregon legislature, which attempted to intervene, with the result being the formation of a
technical committee that recommended development of a rapid, statewide, all-wetlandtypes method. ORWAP’s author, Paul Adamus, tells the story:
Adamus: And what happened was some members of the legislature got impatient
and insisted on developing their own simplified ranking of wetland types without
input from scientists. Fortunately cooler heads prevailed and multiple
stakeholders were recruited to advise the development of an appropriately
detailed, science-based method that could support wetland categorization.
Instead of letting the legislature mandate wetland classes, agencies supported the
development of ORWAP which could assess any kind of wetland. Categorization is
important for where bankers do restoration work, as I show below. The state has marked
out farmed wetlands, which for the most part require enhancement work, as less worthy
of restorationists’ attention.
The third part of the regulatory moment of value’s assessment is regulators’
deployment of watershed and landscape approaches to recommend and approve bank
sites. The idea behind these approaches inspired by the 2008 final rule is to facilitate
banking in sites that meet watershed needs like pollution reduction or flood prevention.
For DSL regulator Dana Hicks, one of the big successes of the COTE process - launched
just months after the final rule came down - was, “to try to encourage mitigation where it
made the best ecological sense and discourage impacts in areas that we really wanted to
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to keep because of their value for various functions provided.” For her, the COTE
approach meets the need both for better bank siting and to identify areas to keep impacts
away from. Mapping these sites gives agencies and allied conservationists something to
point to when they get funding for restoration; it gives them a plan. Oregon’s Department
of Forestry and Wildlife has written wildlife plans but it has also aggregated and mapped
these into a number of areal units that it calls Conservation Opportunity Areas. TNC has
drawn up a “Willamette Valley Synthesis Map” that brings together a set of habitat,
hydrologic, and geomorphic GIS “layers”, including the COAs, to identify restoration
priorities. Though it was developed by TNC, a non-profit, the map has become something
regulators and conservationists alike regularly point to.

Figure 4.2b. The TNC Synthesis Map of “conservation opportunity areas” in the
Washington County area. Areas shaded blue indicate aquatic priorities. Source: The
Nature Conservancy 2011.

82

4.2c: Market
The Synthesis Map is the crux of the final moment in value’s measure - the
market moment. In the protocols that the WP has established for its ecosystem service
marketplace, trading ratios deliver more credits to bankers doing work in priority areas
and require developers in sensitive areas to buy more. The ratios establish what WP calls
a “Reserve Pool” of credits that the group administers as means to cover compensation
requirements if a bank fails. The way it works is that if a bank were to set up shop in an
area demarcated in the Synthesis Map they earn the full amount of credits - none have to
go to the Reserve Pool. If they bank elsewhere they have to pay into the pool a certain
percentage of their credits, the idea being that banking outside of the priorities constitutes
a future risk from the landscape from invasive species or other factors that make the site
not a priority. COTE participants designed the trading ratios to deal with location (and
timing) of restoration as well as impacts (developers filling in a priority salmon habitat
area will need to buy more credits). At present, WP uses the ratios only if a banker
chooses to (and none have), but DSL has considered adopting them as part of its own
regulatory program (DSL 2011).
With the limitation that regulators can only ask for equivalent compensation of
resources - a precedent established down the street from PS’s grocery store wetland in the
Dolan v. City of Tigard US Supreme Court case - it is unclear whether the state can
actually require these ratios. As a DSL regulator explains it:
Kirk Jarvie: Again we’re constrained by a statutory obligation that says mitigation
will be limited to the the lost functional attributes of the impact site itself.
Depending on how you interpret that, it might be difficult to require somebody to
do more than they would otherwise be applied.
Jarvie adds that there was a lot of “behind the scenes” work at COTE playing with the
numbers to balance incentivizing better site selection while not discouraging bankers.
Though they may not be able to require them yet, as regulators and conservationists work
together on facilitating better site selection, trading ratios may constrain bankers.
Across all moments, planning for and evaluating restoration sites for Oregon’s
ecosystem service market solicits a particular kind of spatial optic - a lens for measuring
value and seeing how each individual bank squares with that vision of landscape and
context ecological effects. The key point is that some spatial optics may work for the
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state’s and conservationists’ goals for restoration, but not consultants’. In the next
section, I show how they in fact do not work for consultants.

4.3: Three Problematics in the Measure of Value
Value is not given in space. It is defined, contested, and contingent and in Oregon
this revolves around three problematics in how restoration sites are planned for, chosen,
and evaluated: 1) the extent to which offsite factors are included in bank criteria; 2)
defining the sites that are especially valuable; 3) categorizing particular kinds of wetlands
in the landscape as valuable or not.

4.3a: Site Context
The first sticking point between consultants and regulators centers on the measure
of the landscape context of restoration sites. The more regulators - or the ecosystem
service calculators they require - capture and weight landscape factors, the more bankers
are constrained because they rarely can do anything about ecological conditions and
processes in surrounding parcels. The extent to which regulators in Oregon take heed of
banker concerns about landscape assessment is questionable. Several examples illustrate
that regulators only go so far in asking bankers to manage for the landscape and not just
the restoration site. When Jonas Moiel was trying to get his bank approved, the IRT
hassled him about the typical offsite culprit, reed canary grass. They ultimately backed
down: “Eventually what I said, well what do you want me to do, convert everybody
around me into a wetland bank?” According to consultant Mike Allsworth, regulators
could say no to a site proposal if they did not think it was sustainable, but ultimately the
banker can still move forward by developing ways of dealing with invasives and other
offsite risks. Putting in shrubs, buffers, or bonds may be somewhat of a cost, but it is not
a rejection.
Allsworth claims that bankers unquestionably consider offsite factors in choosing
a site, but how they have to assess landscape context is still ecologically questionable,
according to one of their leading advocates, Sean Pickles.
Pickles: But the bigger issue that a lot of us tend to think is inherent to ORWAP is
it looks at not your site alone, but it looks at a much larger area....So I think the
real big question a lot of us have is: we understand the scientific principle of
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acknowledging all of these offsite kind of resources but how are they influencing
the outcome? And we don’t know that. ....The more I use something like ORWAP
you know the more questions I have like why is it appropriate to compare this
site, how big it is, to something that might be within a 2 mile radius. I need a
strong real world connection. If the issue was that that there was you know uh
connectivity to something that was contiguous, I can sort of see the corridor effect
as being significant. Something that’s a mile away on the other side of the
freeway, you know I’m feeling like we’re adding in an element that is
insignificant.
Accounting for landscape context may be scientifically sound, but doing so impinges on
the final site score. For Pickles, the problem is not so much about the effect on the score,
but the ecological reasoning it embeds. He needs ORWAP to show him a “real world
connection” and it needs to be a significant one, too. In short, at this point regulators will
press bankers on how they plan to deal with landscape factors, but will only go so far in
claiming that the offsite future makes the bank a bad idea. However, as Pickles notes, the
calculators themselves still embed a landscape assessment that constrains site scores,
behind bankers’ backs, outside of the IRT setting.

4.3b: Priority areas
Bankers may also benefit from offsite conditions and processes. DSL can do
nothing about the rock quarry upstream from HML, but it benefits from being upstream
of populated 100-year floodplains; HML provides a water storage and delay value.
Demarcating the good sites for banking is the second problematic in valuing ecosystem
services in Oregon. What are the conditions from which bankers can benefit from space,
and do they? Why value a site like HML in particular?
The ecological reasoning that defines what counts as a good restoration site is a
stage set largely by regulators and conservationists in Oregon. At times, consultants may
agree with the reasoning and on other accounts they do not. As Yvonne Vallette, EPA,
noted earlier, the possibility of developing multiple kinds of credits adds value to a site.
Sites mapped within priority areas are also more valuable. There is no one definition for
what makes for a priority and although the Synthesis Map serves to set the table, WP
retains the right to call any bank a priority even if it does not strictly fall within the
already mapped priority boundaries. An alternative criterion WP uses is an ORWAP
score above 50% functioning, the idea being that already functioning wetlands are
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important to protect and to improve. Related, headwaters make for good restoration sites.
Upper portions of watersheds are thought by regulators and conservationists to be
generally less disturbed than low-lying, farmed floodplain wetlands and less polluted
from upstream areas. HML, for instance, makes for a good site according to regulators
and conservationists. It incorporates both a stream and wetland and is in the headwaters,
at least compared to the other Washington County banks. It is also located in a Synthesis
Map area.
Bankers tend to employ a different ecological reasoning about what makes a good
site. Jonas Moiel is sometimes frustrated by how regulators and conservationists identify
sites as priorities.
Moiel: The thing that's been frustrating to me is that high priority areas are being
identified through a variety of data sources such as GIS overlays for salmon
habitat or endangered species, but that many areas may be overlooked when
taking this approach. For example, endangered plant locations are added to the
state database only when found and recorded, but that doesn't mean that
endangered plants don't exist outside of the database and/or other high priority
areas. The Tualatin Valley Bank is adjacent to a salmon bearing stream and
provides rearing habitat for juvenile salmon; however the agencies do not classify
this is a high priority because it is located off the main stem of the Tualatin River
which does not provide spawning habitat. In this case, the system is flawed
because the site has high quality fish habitat which is beneficial to salmonids;
rearing habitat is known to play a large role in juvenile salmon health and
survival.
While supportive of priority areas in general, Moiel questions the use of GIS layers to
objectively identify priority sites because layers miss important nearby offsite factors
when each one only focuses on a single criterion. He goes on to note that prioritization
might actually help bankers identify good opportunities for banking, but again he
questions what counts as a good opportunity in the first place.
Moiel: Yea, I don't know if prioritization would make banking more or less
difficult, its just one step in the research process. I think that prioritizing areas can
be helpful when looking for new restoration sites, however this approach can be
flawed in that it may keep people from investigating the facts on their own. It
seems that many times priorities are set by identifying areas with known existing
ecological value such as fish habitat which may overlook valuable habitat such as
corridors. Fragmented pieces of habitat that provide a corridor of transport for
fish as wildlife are very valuable but may not be prioritized if located in an area
that doesn't have known endangered species nearby.
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Moiel asks why corridors do not count as valuable in mitigation banking. His ecological
reasoning extends beyond the thinking that a big island, or bank, is best for conservation,
to think about what birds and other land animals (and maybe plant species) need to make
it from wetland to wetland. 10 Ultimately, Moiel claims, the state should not and will
likely not necessarily compel bankers on the question of whether they are banking in a
priority area.
Many conservationists and regulators themselves are more hopeful about the
state’s role in valuing potential sites for bankers. For a conservationist from TNC,
agencies should in fact be more forceful in getting bankers to work on good sites. Cathy
Macdonald’s a proponent of a program the state had come up with previously to
incentivize priority area work. She summarizes it by noting that as with any market, some
places are more productive or trafficked than others.
Macdonald: And it will mean not everybody will get to play, just like everybody
doesn’t get to play in any other commodity. There are places that are better for
corn than others. There should be places that are better to do conservation.
Macdonald envisions the state playing an active role in setting the stage for site selection
by making clear that some are more valuable than others. A former regulator and COTE
participant, Bill Abadie, agrees that ideally the agencies would first identify the site best
suited to banking and then offer it to a banker. That kind of site selection has so far been
the exception.
Abadie: Ideally, an ecologically high value parcel that is important to the stream
that needs restoration would be identified. It would be beneficial to have a
regional wetland restoration plan that identifies areas for restoration. A parcel of
land with restoration potential would be identified, and then we would encourage
somebody to convert it into a bank or an individual/single party mitigation site.
However, most of the banking here, is opportunistic. In other words, the
landowner and/or the banker already own the land or was able to obtain the
property for a good price.
Abadie is pragmatic rather than ideal about the ability of agencies to overcome
“opportunistic” banking, or banking in which the entrepreneur develops a particular site
because it was more convenient than finding the “high value parcel.” At another state
agency, DEQ, Ranei Namura reflects Abadie’s pragmatism about site selection. For her,
priority areas are broadly set by the TMDLs and many of the TMDLs are focused on
10

Distance to other islands is the other half of IBT.
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mainstem water bodies lower in the watershed and farther away from prime salmon
habitat in need of restoration. As a result, until TMDLs are updated with more work on
tributaries in a watershed, Nomura will take what restoration she can get in areas covered
by the TMDL with the hope that these actions with further encourage action throughout
the basin.
Nomura: The way we did the Rogue Basin TMDL [temperature reduction plan],
it’s perfectly legitimate for Medford [an Oregon city] to conduct restoration
actions on the Rogue River even though fisheries agencies would prefer work on
the tributaries to the Rogue. Work on the mainstem of the Rogue would get the
city more kcals for their money - as trees grow, they provide a larger portion of
shade over a wider river than they would a smaller tributary. A 20 foot tree is
going to shade and block more solar radiation on a 50 foot wide river than a 10
foot wide stream. So even though the 10 foot stream might be a higher priority,
the wider river may be more cost-effective for ratepayers, which is fine with DEQ
because the mainstem still needs riparian restoration to improve the health of the
watershed. It’s a tradeoff that we try to balance.
She goes on to note that strategizing about site selection is difficult anyway because “the
landowners need to volunteer” and different groups have different ideas about priority
areas. 11
But the institutional and subjective positions of DEQ and of Abadie are somewhat
idiosyncratic. DEQ is running its own compensation program apart from Corps, EPA,
and DSL oversight. Abadie is with the Corps, but does not work in compensatory
mitigation anymore. Yvonne Vallette, at EPA, is more insistent on the potential of ratios
and other means of convincing restorationists to go to the right places.
Vallette: Well we recognize that site selection is key, we’ve always known that in
the wetland arena, but we couldn’t tell bankers go here versus here. I mean their
choices are strictly based on economics, you know, meaning the cheapest piece of
land that you know. So what we had to do is figure out how to, you know how to
play into those economics, meaning if you look for a better spot, you can make
more. But the current ratio or scheme of crediting wouldn’t, just really didn’t
account for that....And we now have because of GIS tools and various you know
resource censusing tools that we have, we can look at all these overlays and
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Nomura added, “To assist with the implementation of its temperature trading program,
Medford contracted with The Freshwater Trust, “…an action-oriented 501(c)(3) not-for-profit
that restores rivers and streams throughout Oregon.” While there may have been some initial
concern about restoration only being performed on the mainstem of the Rogue, Medford’s
restoration projects to date are in important salmon-bearing tributaries to the Rogue River.”
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determine where all these you know priorities not only for what the immediate
needs are for you know like with regards to water quality and things like that, but
also targeting to what we know historically should or could occur there.
At least some agencies - the ones with more developed mitigation programs, like EPA are going forward with devising means of getting bankers to conserve priorities. The idea
is to use GIS to find sites that can meet immediate watershed needs and historical
patterns and then to incentivize restoration in those spaces. But as Moiel noted, GIS does
not see all - it embeds its own ecological reasoning - and agencies may be hard pressed to
justify its use. Although at the moment the state may not be requiring sites to the extent
some conservationists wish, it is playing a heavier hand on site selection than it has
previously. The state is doing this even if the bankers think agencies cannot do anything
about their site selection.

4.3c: Categorization
If bankers are not going to want to work in the more valuable spaces because it is
more expensive and regulators do not force them to go there, where else would they go?
Whether bankers’ current restoration practice is still worthwhile is the third problematic
of value in Oregon’s ecosystem service market.
Currently, entrepreneurs would typically bank on cropped floodplain wetlands.
These are agricultural areas that do not necessarily have wetland vegetation, but do retain
some wetland hydrology. Bankers therefore undertake wetland enhancement work on
these kinds of wetlands (see chapter 3). However, agencies and conservationists are
skeptical of the value of this work after a series of reports have shown that enhancement
of wetlands in Washington County and others in the Portland metro region has resulted in
a net loss of acreage and functions (Shaich and Franklin 1995). Enhancement work does
not start from scratch; it repairs an already existing wetland. Developers might destroy a
whole wetland site, but enhancement improves wetland hydrology especially only a little
bit. Functional assessment also constrains bankers in that certain kinds of sites are harder
to uplift functionally. Farmed floodplain wetlands, for instance, by definition already
have some hydrological function and so are harder to produce an uplift out of. By
measuring restoration success in terms of functions, the “functions fight” between
regulators and bankers takes on a spatial form.
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The way bankers and their consultants pick sites is somewhat opportunistic. That
is, it is responsive to availability and convenience. The ideal restoration site is a
previously farmed one, but not necessarily a cropped wetland. The restoration ratio
provides the best ratio of credits per acre worked on (creation provides the 2nd best ratio,
but is typically more difficult/risky):
Moiel: Well, for wetlands an ideal site is one that can achieve a high percentage
of restoration credit. Ideally, one would know the locations of drainage features
such as drain tiling and they would be easy to reverse to restore historic
hydrology. If the site is in agriculture, hopefully the farmer kept it clean of nonnative plants, which would make the conversion easier and less costly…..When
looking for a new mitigation site I review a variety of data sources such as soils
mapping and aerial photography. If it appears to historically have been wetland
but currently has upland plant species growing on it, it may have a high potential
for wetland restoration. It's difficult to find a site that produces all restoration
credit as many sites have existing wetlands which receive less credit per acre
(enhancement ratio of 3:1). The Tualatin Valley Bank site has enhancement,
creation and restoration. Ideally it would have had more restoration credit
potential but its a great piece of habitat and will still be a profitable endeavor, I
hope.
JM adds that a competitor in Washington County, Kral, found the right site, one where he
predicts that can do a lot of restoration and earn more credits. He found it through
personal contacts, much like CWS, DSL, and WP were lucky to find him, as he was
already in the restoration loop and wanted restoration work done at HML. Though most
of the HML work is in restoration, the site was not planned out as the site to bank on, nor
did any incentives sway the banker to go there; finding it was fortuitous. Moiel says
“good luck” finding the perfect site and then making a deal on it. Entrepreneurs have to
be quite pragmatic about site selection.
Most banks have instead consisted of wetland enhancement. Does functional
assessment give bankers the sites they need for their enhancement projects to pencil out?
Maybe not, they think (see chapter 3). Yet consultant Brent Haddaway notes that bankers
want to do enhancement precisely because bankers want to work in multiple credit type
areas, i.e. in “the right position” - areas with wetlands and streams. By emphasizing
hydrological uplift, however, ORWAP constrains bankers’ enhancement work and may
push it toward more risky wetland creation activity, Haddaway remarks. The assessment
tool limits what bankers want to do. As a WP document puts it (2012, 4, available from
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author), there will be “winners and losers” for using ORWAP to credit sites instead of
ratios.
Regulators do not seem to be so concerned about the fallout from how ORWAP
measures hydrological uplift. Not only does ORWAP impinge on enhancement work, but
so do DSL regulations. DSL sets guidance on what types of land qualify as degraded and
are hence appropriate for enhancement (DSL 2011). Essentially, the guidance makes it
hard for cropped wetlands to count as degraded. For instance, compaction and tilling
from farm activities do not count as enhanceable degradations. The agency’s goal here is
to account for enhancement’s poor performance record and for the majority of impact
types in the Portland metro area (Shaich and Franklin 1995). One of the most important
functions lost in the urban landscape where most of the impacts occur is water storage
and delay. But with enhancement there is very little improvement on that function. Water
storage and delay may not actually be ecologically replaceable elsewhere (as Sean
Pickles told us above) but not restoring it can nevertheless constitute a loss. Regulators
and conservationists alike cite a report from EPA on mitigation in the Portland metro that
looked at some of the earliest mitigation projects and found that most were enhancement
or creation but failed to achieve the no net loss of functions and acreages goal (Shaich
and Franklin 1995).
Consultant Mike Allsworth disagrees with the reasoning behind how DSL has
determined hydrological degradation. He claims that of course the use of tiling and other
farm activities change site hydrology.
Allsworth: What’s hydrologic degradation? Well, tiling. Now there’s a lot of
research out there, there’s some science out there that shows that these sites that
are farmed on a regular basis where they come in and they till em and the put in a
plow pan and they put in these little shallow ditches, those have limited effect but
farming a site on an annual basis has a significant impact on the amount of water
that flushes off the site initially. ... That’s hydrologic degradation, but that’s not
enough [for DSL]. Now, ok, what’s enough? What’s - there’s the question, that’s
the science that I wonder, how much hydrologic degradation is necessary to
qualify?
Allsworth critiques DSL’s characterization of degradation as too subjective because it
does not provide a standard, numerical basis for determining degradation. Theoretically,
the use of ORWAP would resolve this problem since the assessment tool does provide a
measure of actual hydrologic degradation and lift. However, as I illustrated in the last
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chapter, consultants claim that ORWAP is actually not sensitive enough to pick up on
changes in hydrological functioning. The result is that entrepreneurs are stuck in a
double bind. The assessment tool that DSL is set to require them to use does not provide
them the number of credits they would expect from their tried and trued cropped wetland
enhancement sites. Even if ORWAP did give them the right numbers, DSL has already
more or less taken a whole class of ecosystems off the map for restoration work. DSL
says “restore functions,” but does not provide the means or the spaces for entrepreneurs
to do so.
When accounting for the spatial dependence of ecosystem service provision, the
state is somewhat conciliatory to entrepreneurs on several points, like the effect of offsite
reed canary grass, quarries, or beavers on a bank, or bank placement in watershed priority
sites. The state is however now pushing consultants to restore the spaces it believes can
provide some kind of functional gain. These are not cropped wetlands or sites with
enhancement potential. Functional assessment has been difficult to deploy, because the
spaces ORWAP and agency rules make visible as strategic for banking are not the ones
entrepreneurs see. Some consultants suggest bankers will quit working; others talk of
lawsuits. The question is: How far the state will push on functions and values going
forward and to what effect?

4.4: Crisis?
To understand the extent to which the state will keep working towards better site
assessment and selection for the market and to what effect, I argue that it is helpful to see
the problematics of value’s measure as reaching a crisis point. This means attending to
the specifics of the current political moment and how they might differ over time.
Without a crisis moment perspective, we might see bankers refraining from restoration or
suing the state as flukes that can be solved with better rules, maps, or assessment tools,
rather than seeing them as part of a more systemic problem. That problem is what most
market actors would agree is an ecological crisis, in that the Willamette Valley continues
to lose wetland and stream functions and habitat. This is knotted into a crisis of
capitalism, where restoration entrepreneurs are unable to profitably improve ecosystems
at the same time developers need to buy their credits to cover impacts. In turn, this is
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wrapped up into an institutional crisis over implementing mandates to advance watershed
approaches and functional assessment. The crisis revolves around the ability of
regulators, conservationists, and bankers to account for what they see as nature’s values.
As a regulation-based market, the agencies that comprise the state play a pivotal
role in fashioning and resolving the crisis. Whitehead et al. (2006, 87) aid us in
understanding state spatial strategies in demonstrating how land use maps allow states “to
make sense of nature and order it spatially” by imagining different uses to which states
could subject land. When regulators from DSL or EPA point out a particular habitat on
the Synthesis Map, they imagine that land as worthwhile to restore. What Whitehead et
al. (2006) are not so helpful for in the Oregon case is explaining why states become
interested specifically in “putting a value” on nature/land. In their theory, the state is
selfish - out to centralize and territorialize for its own ends. But the capitalist state is also
wrapped up in regulating the excesses of capital even as it facilitates accumulation
(Polanyi 1944). The state plays a vital role in constituting, or “articulating,” the
(spatially-explicit) value of the ecosystem services entrepreneurs wish to restore
(Robertson 2012b; Ernstson 2012).
The state does not, however, necessarily make value out of thin air at the behest
of capital (Jessop 2002). David Harvey (1982) shows us why the value of nature is
constituted spatially and the effects of how states come to assess it. In his grand rereading of Marx’s critique of capitalism, Harvey argues that landowners play a
"coordinating role" in facilitating and constraining accumulation as capitalists engage
with the land. Land has no value per se, just a payment price, or ground rent. As rent does
not reflect value proper, so capital is prone to over investment in (speculation) and
underutilization of land. What matters here is that, for Harvey, the state can play a similar
role to landowners in using signals like interest rates to coordinate how capitalists invest
in land. Through land use planning and zoning, mapping COAs and other priority areas,
and raising the bar for different types of restoration work, the state shapes how capital
employs land to improve nature’s benefits. 12 We have seen how mapping the good sites
from the bad, the valuable from the not, can be detrimental to accumulation. In its
12

The extent to which the state can do this is in part reliant on regulators securing digital tools
and objects that allow the state and its allies to point to a map or spreadsheet and say, “this is
valuable” (Meehan et al. 2013).
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coordinating role, the state may not serve merely as “the executive committee of the
bourgeoisie”:
While the state can undoubtedly put its stamp on geographical structures, it does
not necessarily do so in ways that effectively bind the use of land to competition
or the process of geographical re-structuring to the accumulation of capital.
(Harvey 1982, 271)
The state does not always serve as the political apparatus of capitalists even as it
organizes investment in the land. Harvey suggests that the state can go too far. Through
its own investments, strong regulations, and outright ownership of land, the state can
question the very ideal of private property. To be clear, Oregon regulators have not
abolished private ownership, but they are constraining restoration capital by devaluing
enhancement of cropped wetlands and prioritizing site selection. 13 Harvey illustrates how
value can - and ultimately, must - work for capital at the same time the state can ask
entrepreneurs to go to more costly but more valuable places.
Understanding the state as both facilitator and constrainer of capital suggests that
the effect of the state’s current spatial planning in Oregon’s ecosystem services market is
in the long-run ambivalent. That bankers are in fact not content with how the state has
constituted value in the market means that the state currently operates in a marketconstraining mode. But, as the Oregon banker and consultant JM highlighted earlier,
priority area maps may facilitate banking by identifying and exposing potentially
profitable sites. As such, bankers could eventually adjust to regulators’ expectations
about where it is best to do restoration. The result would constitute an “uneven
development”(Smith 1984), or, “variegation” (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010;
Bakker 2013; Matulis 2013) of investment in restoration, where entrepreneurs come to
site banks in those areas that have been named as the most ecologically and financially
rewarding. This may not be problematic ecologically, except that it would likely enforce
the split in which functions lost at in urban places like THPRD are replaced in rural areas
like HML.

13

Other kinds of land use restrictions coming from other parts of the state in Oregon have
certainly triggered claims that private property is no more; see Walker and Hurley 2011)
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4.5: Conclusion
The neighbor’s complaint against permitting the THPRD trail was ultimately
unsuccessful. However, the DSL-THPRD trade has been only one of a few in the salmon
habitat currency so far. Another trade involving salmon habitat is in the works, again with
agencies using the credits as proxies for stream quality (DSL 2012c). The application for
the development permit and approval to purchase credits is being extended, in part
because a commenting agency is requesting an alternative design. The Oregon
Department Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) wants the developer of a new housing
subdivision to implement a better culvert design so as to increase non-salmon fish
passage and this would reduce the need for the developer to purchase stream credits. The
ODFW commentator is perhaps worried about keeping fish in the city because only there
does it have the same kind of value.
In Oregon’s ecosystem services markets, the ways regulators, conservationists,
and entrepreneurs plan for, choose, and evaluate restoration sites revolve around
measures of “value.” For them, value describes the opportunity and constraint for an
ecosystem service to do something for society. Consultants, however, contest how the
market currently articulates and circulates value. COTE participants want to move to a
functions-based approach to mitigation, while consultants question: 1) why agencies see
certain ecologies as valuable; 2) agencies’ authority to ask them to do banking in priority
areas; 3) whether functions-oriented assessments and rules will work for them. It is
getting to the point where some consultants challenge the state’s authority to ask them to
use functional assessment. In this way, new strategies for governing resources not just at
individual sites but across watersheds and landscapes are contested, contingent, and
variegated (cf. Cohen 2012). The state in Oregon is using digital tools like ORWAP, GIS,
and other mapping utilities to ask questions about what kinds of ecological functions are
most valuable where. The greater the extent to which the state makes it difficult for
developers to make impacts in valuable areas and incentivizes restoration in these areas,
the more capital is constrained.
I have argued that the state’s hand becomes strong in setting the precise terms of
market-based conservation, and not necessarily in the sense of market roll-out. But
whether it will continue to do so is questionable. Regulators find themselves in the
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position of facing the contradictions of neoliberalization. Agencies have built a market to
get private money into conservation, but want to compel where restoration is done.
Ultimately, what looking at how states - with conservationist allies - and entrepreneurs
plan for, choose, and evaluate restoration sites does is this: It focuses our attention on the
spatial logics and political contexts of new markets in conservation (Roth and Dressler
2012). When Corson, MacDonald, and Neimark (2013) call for paying attention to the
social relations and metrics of these markets, we should heed changes over time, within
specific historical-geographical contexts, in order to see the moments where neoliberal
conservation confronts its own contradictions. I flesh this idea out below in the
conclusion.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
5.1: Ecosystem Service Logics
Pundits like Pavan Sukhdev are hopeful that ecosystem service markets are means
to “putting a value,” or price, on nature’s benefits, while left-leaning scholars worry that
this is exactly what will happen. Here, I have suggested that the design and
implementation of markets for ecosystem services may not actually have the effect of
commodifying and pricing the environment. According to environmental economists, the
wetland, salmon habitat, water temperature commodities that define these markets require
some kind of ecological measure, but the ones regulators and non-profit conservationist
groups have introduced in Oregon have proven to be obstacles to fully-fledged trading
and price discovery. At first glance, they did seem to work. In early 2012, DSL sold four
salmon habitat restoration credits to a suburban Portland parks department. The sale was
a key moment vindicating the COTE metric-making process and its test on the ground at
HML. Salmon habitat functions like surface water storage were assessed, stacked with
other credit types, and HML was well-positioned in the watershed context. It turned out,
however, that the salmon habitat credit wasn’t traded for an actual habitat impact. A
neighbor to the park project disputed the functional assessment of the site. Though HML
was a good place to do restoration, it was more of an opportunistic find than a strategic
placement. HML was a state agency project which so far has not done its job of inspiring
private restoration entrepreneurs to participate in a revitalized market.
Why haven’t mitigation bankers adopted the HML model? Simply put, regulators’
and conservationists’ rationales for why there should be a market and how it should work
differ from entrepreneurs’. More specifically, I’ve provided three answers in this thesis,
all of which can contribute to the existing literature on market-oriented conservation
governance. First, it helps political ecologists and those studying neoliberal natures
explain how the production, application, and circulation of knowledge about nature is
successful or is contested and what the effect on market outcomes is (chapter 3). I
discussed how regulators, conservationists, and entrepreneurs have tried come to terms
ecological assessments to use to define the credit commodities at the heart of the market.
My argument was that different kinds of expectations about what measures can do are
what prove controversial in and limiting to the market. For the most part, regulators and
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entrepreneurs agree that the “stacking” of or selling of multiple kinds of credits from one
site is sound practice, even if not ideal. Regulators themselves are divided on whether the
salmon habitat credit is adequate for market purposes. It may be useful for now, but
won’t be in the long run. Entrepreneurs are skeptical of using functions-based assessment
and crediting even though regulators have hoped bankers would adopt it. Everyone
agrees the old system is broken, and the state gains some legitimacy as it points to
statutory requirements to roll-out functional accounting. But at this point entrepreneurs
are not likely follow through and implement functions-based banks.
The Oregon case also gives political ecologists and ecosystem services
researchers alike reason to pay attention to the spatial logics of efficiency and
prioritization which constitute the planning for, choosing, and evaluation of restoration
sites for markets (chapter 4). My claim was that in Oregon these have limited market
activity. Coming on the heels of the 2008 federal rule which prioritized watershed
planning, COTE participants developed protocols that would drive restoration to the
“right places” on the landscape and limit impacts to those areas. Regulators and nonprofit conservationists adhering to this logic see the value in restoring nature as
fundamentally spatial - some places are more worthwhile to restore than others. In a
market restoration scheme, they argue, entrepreneurs should be guided to do restoration
in these priority areas. Prioritization appears to be a revamping of the market to better
commodify and commercialize wetland and stream ecosystems, and ultimately foster
capital accumulation. But being driven to work in priority areas gives bankers a narrower
range of landowners to work with. And all else equal, they’ll want to work on sites where
they can get the most credit bang for their restoration buck. Prioritization entails bankers
having to work on sites with higher costs of restoration and potentially higher land prices,
both of which would cut into their profits. This has led them to be hesitant to adopt the
HML model of watershed planning and prioritization.

5.2: Not necessarily neoliberalization
Finally, what do the previous two explanations of why attempts to define an
ecosystem service commodity have been contentious do for us? They illustrate that the
maxim that “capital encounters barriers in its own nature” (Marx 1857, 410; also see
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Smith 1984, 85) really does describe moments when capital confronts the environment
just as well as it describes capitalist expansion in general. Revamping a market in
ecosystem services might seem like a clear-cut case of a neoliberal roll-out of rules and
regulations favorable to a capitalist accumulation of new kinds of resources. But I have
argued that it is more ambiguous than that, and this ambiguity opens a political moment
for intervention.
Oregon regulators’ and conservationists’ desire to revamp the market illustrates
contradictions in the neoliberal logic of ecosystem markets. While the state wants
entrepreneurs to restore ecosystems, it wants them to do so in what are not necessarily the
most profitable locations - in “strategic” rather than “opportunistic” places. Regulators
are in a position where they oversee a market that is based on the idea of welcoming
private investment in ecosystem services restoration, yet they are uncomfortable with the
idea of letting such investors invest just anywhere. Likewise, the state’s move to roll-out
new function-based measures of restoration success flounders on the fact that
entrepreneurs are tied to the old currency. Again, regulators have designed and
implemented a market that at its core was about facilitating private restoration of
ecosystem services, but at the same time they do not think that just any definition of the
credit commodity traded in the market will work. They would like to see a better credit,
but it is one that constrains entrepreneurial restoration.
The state is forced to confront previous rounds of neoliberalization: previous
mitigation banking ratio currencies, established in a first “wave” of neoliberalization,
prove to be the barrier to implementing a better credit commodity. And it’s hard now for
the state to ask private bankers to do restoration in places the state values because the
original goal of these “no net loss” markets was to privatize, commercialize, and
commodify restoration. Regulators may or may not be able continue to hold their position
vis-à-vis bankers. In large part, where the state will go will in large part depend on how
regulators see themselves performing this project, but also whether entrepreneurs adjust
to new market conditions.
The takeaway is that the long-term and short-term effects of market-oriented
conservation projects are potentially two very different things. There is a difference
between regulators’, consultants’, and conservationists’ long-term and short-term
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expectations about what knowledges can work for the market, and what nature can do. In
the short-term, salmon habitat might work for regulators as a way to account for stream
functions, but in the long-term it won’t. The same goes for stacking - there is a consensus
now, but credit bundlers might come around to advocate more strongly for their position.
Regulators have long-term hopes for functions, but in the short-term this has meant
entrepreneurs may not do restoration. Likewise, when it comes to where to do restoration,
regulators and conservationists have implemented rules and measures that in the shortterm constrain bankers. In the long-term, bankers might get used to what regulators
expect from them when it comes to where to do restoration. The work that regulators and
conservationists have done to map out priority sites could become useful visual aids for
bankers - especially new ones - that describe where they could do work. As regulators
and conservationists have them mapped out right now, restoration investments made in
priority areas would exacerbate the split where urban ecosystem functions are lost in
order to be compensated for in suburban, exurban, and rural areas. This intensification of
investment in particularly worthwhile places at the expense of others is what several
researchers are seeing now in a post-economic crisis, “post-neoliberal” world and calling
“variegated” neoliberalization (Brenner, Peck, Theodore 2010; Bakker 2013; Matulis
2013; In general, this is uneven development. See Smith 1984). Ultimately, these
moments where we can differentiate between short-term and long-run positions, powers,
and consequences are precisely the sort of moments we should pay attention to in order to
see how new markets can collapse under the weight of their own contradictions.

5.3: Future research
That there is an important difference between the short-term and the long-run
suggests that ongoing research may prove worthwhile. Such work should explore how the
state in Oregon continues to push restoration capital on the logic of ecosystem services.
How regulators respond to the effects of climate change on restoration projects - or use
the mitigation framework to confront it - will be a vital moment in this. Climate change
promises to make crop production, urban living, and species and habitat conservation
more challenging around the world, and in some places more than others. Oregon may
not be the world’s worst off, but policy-makers, scientists, and conservationists there are
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nevertheless worried. As the authors of the government-commissioned Oregon Climate
Change Adaptation Plan predicted in 2010, “natural hazards, water supply problems,
drought, habitat changes and loss of ecosystem services will all affect Oregon’s citizens,
communities, and economy.” They have not lost all hope, though, as they continued,
“fortunately, many of the potential costs and consequences of climate change may be
anticipated and planned for” (i). State and local-level governments in Oregon have for
nearly 40 years now implemented what are likely the country’s most comprehensive
strategies and regulations for limiting and directing how businesses develop land and
modify ecosystems (Walker and Hurley 2011). It comes as little surprise that government
agencies there are to at least some extent attempting to plan for the effects of climate
change.
One way agencies might strategize climate change adaptation is through
ecological restoration, as a way of making ecosystem functions and services more
“resilient” to climate variability and weather intensification. As we have seen, planning
for and assessing restoration success is a task which brings regulators, scientists,
conservationists, and entrepreneurs to the same table. Two years after the climate
adaptation report was released, authors of an Integrated Water Resources Strategy (2012)
requested by the state legislature boasted that, “Oregon has taken the unusual step of
crafting a plan without waiting for statewide drought, flooding, litigation, or other crisis,
unlike many other states” as part of “assist[ing] with climate change adaptation and
resiliency strategies.” The question that needs to be asked is, by which metrics does
Oregon assess the success of its adaptation? This assumes that success as a finally
achieved goal is even possible. It may not be if Oregon ecosystems and institutions are
supposed to become dynamic and “resilient.”
Already, two developments point to early answers to how regulators will ask
restoration entrepreneurs to do about climate change. Right before Thanksgiving 2012,
state and federal agencies released preliminary guidance on the kinds of things they want
entrepreneurs and developers that impact streams to be assessing. In the guidance
document, they do focus on the need to assess stream resiliency over time. Meanwhile,
municipal entities in Medford and Eugene are paying landowners to plant riparian trees to
shade streams. Their goal ultimately is to protect salmon habitat, which is likely to be
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affected by higher temperatures and variability in snowmelt timing and amount.
Understanding how these cities account for climate impacts in their programs will at the
very least mean asking questions about site selection and ecological assessment - in short,
everything I’ve talked about here. But the payoff will be insight into the dynamics of
increasingly locally or regionally-based responses to the global problem of climate
change.
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APPENDIX A
Frequently Used Acronyms
Corps – Army Corps of Engineers
CWA – Clean Water Act
CWS – Clean Water Services
DEQ – Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
DSL – Oregon Department of State Lands
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency
ESA – Endangered Species Act
MEA – Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
NCP – The Natural Capital Project
NOAA NMFS – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine
Fisheries Services
NRC – National Research Council
ORWAP – Oregon Rapid Wetlands Assessment Protocol
TEEB – The Economics of the Environment and Biodiversity
TMDL – Total Maximum Daily Load
TNC – The Nature Conservancy
USFWS – United State Fish and Wildlife Service
WP – Willamette Partnership
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